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The Vanishing Employee:   
Putting the Autonomous Dignified Union Worker  
Back to Work 
Anne Marie Lofaso* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At age seventy-five, some are wondering, Whither the Board?  What 
does the future hold for the National Labor Relations Board, that New Deal, 
inside-the-belt, administrative agency tasked by Congress with administer-
ing the National Labor Relations Act?1  Florida International University 
Law Review asks this question at a significant juncture in the NLRB’s histo-
ry.  At the time this symposium took place,2 the normally five-member 
Board had been operating since December 31, 2007, that is, for 817 days, 
with only two members – Democratic Chairman Wilma Liebman and    
Republican Member Peter Schaumber – who during that time decided   
almost 600 cases.3   After operating for over two years under questionable 
authority,4 the NLRB became whole again when President Obama appoint-
ed Craig Becker and Mark Pearce, democrats with union backgrounds, to 
the Board only hours after the March 27, 2010, close of this symposium.5 
                                                                                                                           
 * Anne Marie Lofaso is an Associate Professor at West Virginia University College of Law.  Dr. 
Lofaso gives many thanks to those who commented on early drafts of this article, especially Robert 
Bastress, Tom Cady, Ellen Dannin, David Gregory, Michael C. Harper, Jim Heiko, Jeff Hirsch, Kerri 
Stone, Marley Weiss, and to the West Virginia University College of Law Faculty.  Thanks to Jenny 
Flanigan, Nicholas Stump, and Matthew T. Yanni for their research assistance and to the Bloom Junior 
Faculty Research Grant for its support of this project.  Special thanks to Dean Alex Acosta, the FIU Law 
Review, the FIU faculty and staff, and all the invisible workers for their tireless work in putting together 
this important symposium.  The author assumes responsibility for all errors.  
 1 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 
U.S. 883, 891 (1984); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 693 n.1 (1980); Allied Chem. & Alkali 
Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 
U.S. 111, 130 (1944). 
 2 March 26-27, 2010. 
 3 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 17, 2010) (calculating 
that period in terms of approximately twenty-seven months). 
 4 Id. at 13-14 (holding that the NLRA does not authorize a two-member Board to issue decision). 
 5 Mike Hall, Obama Uses Recess Appointments for NLRB and Other Blocked Nominations, Mar. 
29, 2010, http://blog.aflcio.org/2010/03/29/obama-uses-recess-appointments-for-nlrb-and-other-
blocked-nominations/; see also Obama Appoints Becker and Pearce to the NLRB, American Rights at 
Worker, http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/eye-on-the-nlrb/blog/obama-appoints-becker-and-pearce-
to-the-nlrb-20100329-884-388.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  
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Dean R. Alexander Acosta and the Law Review have tasked the panel-
ists not only with predicting the Board’s future but also with commenting 
on the extent to which the Board’s fate is to “wither” away.6  That pun on 
“w[h]ither” suggests that the Board is destined to dry up, to become sapless, 
to lose life, to shrivel from loss of bodily moisture.7  Typically, the wither-
ing process is slow (in this case three-quarters of a century), natural (in this 
case, the diminishing need, some suggest, for union representation), inter-
nal, and inevitable.8 
In support of the position that the withering process is part of the     
natural aging of certain institutions in an advanced capitalist state, critics 
have offered several explanations for concluding that unions are no longer 
necessary or relevant.  Some union critics argue that unions are no longer 
necessary because they have accomplished their core goals – the eight-hour 
day, better wages, and safer working conditions – through legislation.9  But 
that doesn’t recount the entire story.  After all, unions are at least as       
interested in job security as they are in these other subjects, and job security 
remains an important issue for workers, at least until economists figure out 
how to deal with cyclical unemployment.10  Others argue that, while unions 
may have been relevant in the industrial, manufacturing-based economy of 
the early twentieth-century United States, they are no longer relevant in 
today’s knowledge-based economy.  Those critics base their argument on 
the assumption that unions bargain collectively for a one-size-fits-all con-
tract that favors seniority-based promotions and raises that ignore the    
                                                                                                                           
 6 R. Alexander Acosta, Rebuilding the Board: An Argument for Structural Change, Over Policy 
Prescriptions, at the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 347 (2010).  
 7 Merriam-Webster OnLine, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wither (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2010).  
 8 See, e.g., James Sherk, Do Americans Today Still Need Labor Unions?, FREDERICKSBURG 
FREE LANCE-STAR, Mar. 30, 2008, at A1, available at THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2008/04/Do-Americans-today-still-need-labor-unions.  
 9 For example, in 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201-219, which requires employers to pay covered workers minimum wage rates, and forbids   
employers to employ covered workers “for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee 
receives compensation for his employment in excess of [forty] hours . . . at a rate not less than one and 
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207(a)(1) (2006).  In 1970, 
Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, which 
places on employers both general and specific duties to maintain healthy and safe workplaces.  In addi-
tion to passing these two congressional acts of general applicability, Congress and state legislatures have 
passed numerous other statutes to regulate workplace wages, hours, and safety.   
 10 See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, The Relevance of the Wagner Act for Resolving Today’s Job-
Security Crisis, Labor and Employment Relations Association Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting 
(forthcoming 2011); Anne Marie Lofaso, Talking Is Worthwhile:  The Role of Employee Voice in Pro-
tecting, Enhancing, and Encouraging Individual Rights to Job Security in a Collective System, 14 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.55 (2010).  
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special talents of individual workers.11  That assumption is of course falsi-
fied by the existence of more elastic collective-bargaining agreements, such 
as the basic agreement between Major League Baseball and the Players 
Association, which expressly permits individual bargaining between clubs 
and players over salaries.12  But myth is often more influential than reality. 
I have argued that the NLRA’s protective cover has been eroded not so 
much by natural forces but by the cacophonous efforts of three government 
actors – Congress, the federal courts, and the NLRB itself.13  Together over 
time these players have reduced the Act’s effectiveness as the national    
protector of industrial democracy by shrinking the contours of Section 7, 
weakening the economic weapons at a union’s disposal, reinforcing a weak 
remedial scheme, diminishing worker voice by curbing workers’ card-check 
options to express their desire for collective workplace representation, and 
restricting the statutory definition of employee.14  Coupling this three-part 
federal hymn with the agency’s many structural problems – a two-member 
Board for 817 days and a drawn-out administrative process – has resulted in 
the persistence of union repression,15  notwithstanding national labor policy 
dedicated to “the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.”16   
To accomplish my part in this law review symposium dedicated to   
understanding “w[h]ither the Board,” this article focuses on the statutory 
definition of employee to suggest that the legal mechanism for protecting 
workers is not necessarily withering away from natural processes but is 
being eroded (and in some cases massacred) by those legal institutions   
designed to protect them.  In Section II, I explain why I chose to explore the 
statutory definition to demonstrate the erosion process.  There, I briefly 
explain the significance of analyzing the statutory definition of employee as 
the gateway to all worker protection under the NLRA.  In Section III, I  
deconstruct the statutory definition and show the extent to which it has nar-
rowed over time.  The article’s constructive or perhaps reconstructive    
aspect, presented in concluding Section IV, suggests whither the law can go 
to rejuvenate labor. 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See, e.g., Sherk, supra note 8.  
 12 See MLB.com, 2007-2011 Basic Agreement, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2010).  
 13 See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recogni-
tion, 62 ME. L. REV. 199 (2010) [hereinafter Union Repression]; Anne Marie Lofaso, September Massa-
cre: The Latest Battle in the War on Workers’ Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, AM. 
CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL., (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133607 
[hereinafter September Massacre]. 
 14 See generally Union Repression, supra note 13; September Massacre, supra note 13.  
 15 See Union Repression, supra note 13; September Massacre, supra note 13. 
 16 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
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II. THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE IS SIGNIFICANT 
  BECAUSE IT IS THE GATEWAY TO ALL WORKER PROTECTION UNDER § 7 
 
The heart of the National Labor Relations Act lies in Section 7, which 
defines the main rights granted under the NLRA. 17  In its current statutory 
form, those rights are: 
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall 
also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities . . . . 18 
Reading the statutory language together with the relevant case law, we 
learn that the NLRA protects the rights of employees to:  
 self-organize,19 
 to form, join, or assist unions,20 
 to bargain collectively through representatives chosen by em-
ployees through either a secret-ballot election or by card 
check,21 
 to band together concerted for mutual aid or protection,22 and  
                                                                                                                           
 17 Id. § 157.  
 18 Id.  The NLRA in its original form (the Wagner Act) only included the italicized language.  
Congress added the remaining language in 1947 with the Taft-Hartley amendments.  The definition also 
includes an exception – “except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3)” –  
which is not relevant to the arguments presented here.  Id. 
 19 The Board, with Supreme Court approval, has broadly interpreted “the right of employees to 
self-organize” as “necessarily encompass[ing] the right effectively to communicate with one another 
regarding self-organization at the jobsite.”  Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978). 
 20 The Supreme Court has not fully defined what the meaning of the right to “form, join, or as-
sist” a labor organization, but has articulated instances that the right does not include.  For example, the 
Court has held that this right does not entitle nonemployee union organizers to trespass onto the em-
ployer’s property to assist organization other reasonable alternatives exist.  See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 
502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992). 
 21 The Board, with Supreme Court approval, recognizes both secret-ballot elections and card 
checks as valid methods for determining a union’s majority status.  See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 
385 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).  In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., the Supreme Court also discussed the ways 
in which the right to strike supports collective bargaining: The NLRA’s “repeated solicitude for the right 
to strike is predicated upon the conclusion that a strike when legitimately employed is an economic 
weapon which in great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining 
system.”  NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1963). 
 22 The Board, with Supreme Court approval, has broadly interpreted the mutual aid or protection 
clause to include the concerted activity of unorganized (at-will) employees.  See NLRB v. Wash. Alumi-
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 to refrain from any or all such activities.23 
Section 7 affords significant rights to workers.  Together, these rights 
define what the international community calls the freedom of association – 
a freedom so significant that it is one of the four fundamental principles that 
grounds the International Labour Organisation.24  Perhaps more tellingly, 
the “freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining” is one of only four workers’ rights that the ILO has 
declared fundamental.  The other three are:  
 the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour,  
 the effective abolition of child labour, and  
 the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation. 25  
Under United States federal law, these rights are only afforded to those 
workers who qualify as statutory employees.26  The Supreme Court recog-
                                                                                                                           
num Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-18 (1962) (holding that an employer may not discharge at-will employees for 
impermissibly and spontaneously walking out of their jobs to protest working conditions).  The       
company’s brief to the Supreme Court makes clear that it viewed the Board’s decision as interfering 
with the employer’s right to discharge within the confines of the at-will relationship.  See Brief for 
Respondent, NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., No. 61-464, 1962 WL 115796, at *28-33 (U.S. May 28, 
1962). 
 23 The very little Supreme Court case law on the right to refrain has typically viewed that right as 
clarifying the principle of Board neutrality.  As the Court explained in the context of holding that a 
union’s offer to waive initiation fees for all employees who signed authorization cards before secret-
ballot election interfered with employee’s Section 7 right to refrain from union activities: “Any proce-
dure requiring a ‘fair’ election must honor the right of those who oppose a union as well as those who 
favor it.  The Act is wholly neutral when it comes to that basic choice.”  NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 
U.S. 270, 278 (1973); see also NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213, 216 (1972) (recognizing 
that the right to refrain includes the right of a union member to resign lawfully within the confines of a 
union’s constitution or bylaws).   
 24 ILO   Constitution,   Annex,   Art.   I(b),    http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/amend/ 
constitution.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  The ILO is “the world’s only tripartite multilateral agency.”  
It created as part of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) “that ended World War I, to reflect the belief that 
universal and lasting peace can be accomplished only if it is based on social justice,” and “is dedicated 
to bringing decent work and livelihoods, job-related security and better living standards to the people of 
both    poor    and    rich   countries.”   See   ILO,  Mission   and   Objectives,   http://www.ilo.org/global/ 
About_the_ILO/Mission_and_objectives/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); ILO, Origins 
and History, http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Origins_and_history/lang--en/index.htm (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2010).  
 25 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art. 2, 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 
2010); see also Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, ILO C87, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C087 (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, (ILO C98 1949), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C098 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
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nized the significance of this gateway when, in 1941, only six years after 
the NLRA’s passage, the Court upheld the Board’s interpretation of        
employee to include job applicants.  Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfur-
ter stated: 
Discrimination against union labor in the hiring of [workers] is a dam 
to self-organization at the source of supply.  The effect of such dis-
crimination is not confined to the actual denial of employment; it in-
evitably operates against the whole idea of the legitimacy of organiza-
tion. In a word, it undermines the principle which . . . is recognized as 
basic to the attainment of industrial peace. 27 
Defining the statutory term employee then is significant because, as 
the Supreme Court has pointed out, those rights belong “only to those 
workers who qualify as ‘employees’ as that term is defined in the Act” and 
only those employees are entitled to the Act’s protection.28  This is so, not-
withstanding the fact that all workers would benefit from more fully      
protected freedom of association and more effective protection of collec-
tive-bargaining rights from government and private interference, restraint, 
and coercion.29  And this is so, notwithstanding the belief of many          
dignitaries of the international community “that universal and lasting peace 
can be accomplished only if it is based on social justice.”30 
I have argued in a separate article that work law should be grounded in 
the values of autonomy and dignity.31  Those foundational principles, I    
argue, generate a role for the law to safeguard what I have termed the    
“autonomous dignified worker,” by ensuring that workers are free to      
become part authors of their working lives (autonomy) and that workers are 
treated with the equality of respect afforded to them as human beings    
(dignity) as opposed to commodities.32  I have further argued that, to be 
autonomous, workplaces must satisfy the following four preconditions: the 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Professor Ellen Dannin makes the same point in Not a Limited, Confined, or Private Matter – 
Who Is an “Employee” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 59 LAB. L. J. 5, 5 (2008). 
 27 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941). 
 28 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 89 (1995); see also Union Repression, 
supra note 13.  Workers who are not considered employees under NLRA Section 2(3) not only lose 
federal protection of these fundamental rights, but their mere involvement in an organizing drive would 
be unlawful under Section 8(a)(2)’s (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006)) prohibition against employer inter-
ference with the administration of a labor union. 
 29 See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The 
Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter The Autonomous Dignified 
Worker]. 
 30 ILO,   Origins   and   History,   http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Origins_and_history/ 
lang--en/index.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
 31 See generally The Autonomous Dignified Worker, supra note 29. 
 32 See generally id.  
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mental ability to identify work-life influences, accessibility to information 
sufficient to generate a range of workplace options, independence from 
coercion, and modes of participation that empower workers to effectuate 
changes in their working lives.33  The fourth precondition also dignifies 
workers by flattening the hierarchy between workers and managers.  I have 
also shown that union representation and collective bargaining are compati-
ble with the values underlying the autonomous dignified worker, even if 
they are not the only forms of industrial democracy to promote those     
values.34 
Assuming that I am correct in asserting an appropriate role for the law, 
it is my task below to determine whether the statutory definition of        
employee satisfies my quest for the autonomous dignified worker.  To    
accomplish this goal, I ask the following questions:   
Does that definition broadly include all workers?   
If not, who is excluded and why?   
Has that definition changed over time?   
If so, has the definition become more or less inclusive and what       
rationales have been used to change the definition? 
III. DECONSTRUCTING THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE  
REVEALS A DYNAMIC DEFINITION THAT HAS BEEN NARROWED 
A. The Wagner Act Board Expansively Construed the Definition of      
Employee Consistent with Its Plain Language 
1. The NLRA Defines Employee Both Affirmatively and Negatively 
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935.  At that 
time, Section 2(3) defined employee as follows: 
The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be 
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act     
explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose 
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any cur-
rent labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has 
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See id. at 40-42. 
 34 See id. at 42-48, 57-64.  
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laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, 
or any individual employed by his parent or spouse.35 
The Wagner Board,36 ultimately with Supreme Court approval,37 con-
strued that statutory definition in a manner true to its plain meaning.  The 
Board recognized that the statutory definition has both affirmative and neg-
ative components.38  The Act defines first who an employee is and then who 
an employee is not – who is exempted.  In concert with accepted principles 
of statutory construction, the Board construed the affirmative aspect of that 
definition broadly as written and narrowly construed the exemptions or 
negative aspects.39   
We can express the Board’s construction in the following manner.    
Affirmatively, the Act defined (and continues to define) employee to      
include “any employee” and not just those “employees of a particular     
employer.”40  Negatively, the Act expressly exempted (and still exempts) 
agricultural workers, domestic servants, and certain family members – the 
children and spouses of employers, in particular.  Using “EE” to symbolize 
the term “employee,” “ER” to symbolize employers, “AW” to symbolize 
agricultural workers, “DS” to symbolize domestic servants, and “FAM” to 
                                                                                                                           
 35 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935). 
 36 I use the term “Wagner Board” to refer to the early boards between 1935 and 1947. 
 37 See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1994) (holding that newsboys were        
employees under the NLRA, despite contentions that they are independent contractors and should be 
excepted); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 487-91 (1947) (holding that minor foremen, 
who were responsible for quantity and quality production control in a mass-production industry, were 
employees under the NLRA, notwithstanding contentions that these workers were either employers 
within the meaning of the NLRA or so closely aligned with the employer’s interests that it was undesir-
able to consider them statutory employees). 
 38 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191 (1941) (recognizing that the Act defines 
employee “both affirmatively and negatively”). 
 39 See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 399 (1996) (explaining that the agricul-
tural exemption to the NLRA’s statutory definition of employee is to be narrowly construed); NLRB v. 
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 186-89 (1981) (approving the Board’s 
narrow construction of the confidential employee exception); see also David Wolcott Kendall Mem’l 
Sch. v. NLRB, 866 F.2d 157, 160 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the managerial exception “must be 
narrowly construed to avoid conflict with the broad language of the Act, which covers ‘any employee,’ 
including professional employees”); Ankh Servs., 243 N.L.R.B. 478, 480 & n.17 (1979) (noting that 
Congress intended only to exclude “domestic servants” from the “in the domestic service of any family 
or person at his home” exemption); see also NLRB v. Imperial House Condo., Inc., 831 F.2d 999, 1005 
(11th Cir. 1987) (holding that housekeepers working for a condominium association are not exempted 
from the NLRA’s coverage because they are not domestic servants within the meaning of NLRA Section 
2(3)); Mercy Hosp. of Buffalo v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 661, 666 n.2 (1982) (noting the narrowness of the 
family exception and further noting that “courts have refused automatically to exclude a principal share-
holder’s child or spouse under section 2(3)”) (citing Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 
1979)). 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
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symbolize the employer’s spouse and children, we can schematize the orig-
inal definition of employee in the following way: 
EE = [any EE + ˜ (EEs of a particular ER) + strikers] – [AW + DS + FAM] 
2. The Affirmative Aspect of the Statutory Definition of Employee 
Broadly Includes All Employees Unless Otherwise Exempted 
The Supreme Court has ultimately approved of the Board’s basic con-
struction of the statutory definition of employee as “striking[ly]” broad.41  
But that construction evolved over several years of the NLRA’s life.  From 
the start, the Board, with the approval of reviewing courts, breathed     
meaning into the statutory definition simply by noticing that the affirmative 
part of the definition’s plain language was in fact broadly written to include 
“any employee” and “shall not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer.”42  The plain language thus supported the Board’s view that the 
“statutory definition is of wide comprehension.”43  
But the Board still had to overcome the potentially circular nature of 
the definition.44  To do this, the Board interpreted the broad statutory lan-
guage – “[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any employee”45 – to mean 
“all employees in the conventional as well as legal sense except those by 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984).  In fact, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
approved the early Board’s broad construction of the affirmative aspect of NLRA Section 2(3), 29 
U.S.C. 152(3).  See, e.g., NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 404-12 (1947) (private plant 
guards, who are required to be civilian auxiliaries to the U.S. Army’s military police); NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1947) (deputized plant guards); Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. 
at 191-92 (1941) (job applicants); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (unfair 
labor practice and economic strikers).   
 42 The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Board’s view that Section 2(3)’s broad language, 
which expressly refuses to “‘limit[]’” the statutory term employee “‘to the employees of a particular 
employer’” was “intended to protect employees when they engage in otherwise proper concerted activi-
ties in support of employees of employers other than their own.”  Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 
(1978) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)) (holding that employees seeking to improve the working conditions 
of less privileged workers of other employers are protected in that activity). 
 43 Atl. Greyhound Corp., 7 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1196 (1938) (so stating in the context of rejecting the 
argument that managers and supervisors are not statutory employees because the Board repeatedly relies 
on evidence of the antiunion conduct of such workers as proof that the employer has engaged in unfair 
labor practices); see also Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1274 (1938) (reaffirming the “wide 
scope” of the statutory definition). 
 44 See Marley Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of Professional and Supervisory Status - 
Fertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle?, in LABOR LAW STORIES 353, 356 (Lara J. Cooper & Catherine L. 
Fisk eds., 2005), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/124/ (“[T]he § 2(3) 
definition of ‘employee’ was either extremely broad or else vague, and was, in any event, circular.”).  
 45 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935). 
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express provision excluded.”46  The Board concluded that the “primary con-
sideration” in determining whether a worker is a statutory employee was 
“whether effectuation of the declared policy and purposes of the Act com-
prehends securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection 
afforded by the Act.”  The Board then expounded a “[p]ublic interest in the 
administration of the Act [that] permits an inquiry into the material facts 
and substance of the [employer-worker] relationship.”47  It then proceeded 
to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether including the challenged worker 
within the statutory framework effectuated the policies of the Act.   
As a result of the inductive-part of this approach, the Board, in facing 
early challenges to worker status, concluded that all types of workers were 
statutory employees.  For example, the Board repeatedly concluded that 
strikers who had ceased working because of a labor dispute,48 minor super-
visors,49 and drivers who might ordinarily be classified as independent   
contractors,50 among others, were statutory employees. 
The Board’s fact-based analysis closely followed the Act’s plain-
language imperatives, where applicable.  For example, in the case of     
strikers, the Board pointed out that the statutory definition made clear that 
“any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connec-
tion with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, 
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent 
employment”51 was a statutory employee.  Accordingly, once the Board, 
with Supreme Court approval, established that strikers were expressly   
                                                                                                                           
 46 Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. at 1274 (examining the definition of employee in the context 
of employment contracts purporting to establish the worker’s status as other than employee); Olympia 
Shingle Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1413 (1940). 
 47 Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275; accord Olympia Shingle Co., 26 N.L.R.B. at 1413 
nn.11-12. 
 48 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938); Phelps Dodge Corp., 19 
N.L.R.B. 547, 565-66 nn.20-23 (1940), enforced as modified, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 
202 (2d Cir. 1940), remanded, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Lone Star Gas Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 420, 458 n. 51 
(1939); Mooresville Cotton Mills, 2 N.L.R.B. 952, 956 (1937), enforced on these grounds, Mooresville 
Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1938); Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248, 262 (1936); cf. 
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255-58 (1939) (concluding that the NLRB does 
not have unlimited authority to order reinstatement of Section 2(3) employee-strikers where those strik-
ers have otherwise engaged in dischargeable misconduct); Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 1 
N.L.R.B. 181, 194-95 (1935), enforcement denied on other grounds, NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & 
Stamping Co., 96 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d, 306 U.S. 292, 296-300 (1939) (recognizing that strik-
ers are statutory employees but affirming court’s denial of enforcement of Board’s bargaining order on 
grounds that substantial evidenced did not support Board’s view that union request bargaining at an 
appropriate time). 
 49 Atl. Greyhound Corp., 7 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1196 (1938) (holding that bus terminal dispatcher is a 
statutory employee even though his duties could be described as supervisory). 
 50 Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275. 
 51 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935). 
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included in the statutory definition, the employee-striker cases focused not 
on whether such workers were employees but instead on the question 
whether the employee had “obtained any other regular and substantially 
equivalent employment,” as the statute’s plain language expressly required.   
But in most cases, the Board simply focused on its policy of finding 
employee status by resorting to the “conventional” meaning of that term 
and whether finding a particular worker to be a statutory employee effectu-
ated the NLRA’s policies and purposes: 
In cases where the status of an individual was challenged, we have  
indicated that the statutory definition of the term “employee”         
embraces all employees in the conventional as well as legal sense,   
except those by express provision excluded and that the primary con-
sideration in the determination of the applicability of the statutory def-
inition is whether effectuation of the declared policy and purposes of 
the Act comprehend securing to the individual the rights guaranteed 
and protection afforded by the Act.52 
Using that test, the Board approached the question whether a worker 
was a statutory employee not on the basis of whether the worker could pos-
sibly be classified as something other than an employee, but simply on the 
basis of whether that worker met the broad, conventional definition of   
employee.  Accordingly, rather than disqualifying minor supervisors or   
minor stockholding workers simply because those workers could also be 
characterized as “employers,” the Board reasonably found that the         
following workers were covered by the NLRA simply because they met the 
statutory definition of employee: unskilled lumber stackers and their fore-
man;53 newspaper district managers, who perform all the same work as the 
assistants under their supervision;54 and stockholding workers.55  And rather 
than disqualifying other workers who could be classified as independent 
contractors under common law, the Board reasonably found that the       
following workers were statutory employees, again, simply because they 
met the statutory definition of employee: contract employees,56 truck drivers 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Stockholders Publ’g Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1022-24 n.33 (1941). 
 53 James E. Stark Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1080-81 (1941). 
 54 Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 25 N.L.R.B. 621, 628-29 (1940). 
 55 Olympia Shingle Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 1398, 1413-14 (1940). 
 56 Connor Lumber & Land Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 776, 786-87 (1939). 
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who owned only one truck,57 newspaper motor route drivers,58 newspaper 
delivery carriers,59 and newspaper delivery boys.60 
3. The Negative Aspect of the Statutory Definition of Employee 
Must Be Narrowly Construed 
When Congress originally enacted the NLRA there were only three 
statutory exemptions to the definition of employee:  agricultural workers, 
domestic servants, and the spouses or children of employers.61  The Wagner 
Board narrowly construed those exemptions.  The Supreme Court has also 
ultimately vindicated the Board’s approach: “administrators and reviewing 
courts must take care to assure that exemptions from NLRA coverage are 
not so expansively interpreted as to deny protection to workers the Act was 
designed to reach.”62  And reviewing courts have ultimately vindicated the 
approach of narrowly circumscribing the three original exemptions. 
The Wagner Board’s narrow constructions of those three exemptions 
are still in use today.  The Wagner Board analyzed the express statutory 
exemptions – again by resorting to the common understanding of those 
statutory terms.  In one early case, for example, the Board relied on the 
common understanding of the term “agricultural” to narrowly construe the 
agricultural exemption so as not to include workers who performed the   
services of processing, canning, packing, marketing, and shipping mush-
rooms.63  In another early case, the Board concluded that machine-shop 
workers who maintained and repaired agricultural equipment also were not 
agricultural workers – and noted that its interpretation was consistent both 
with common usage of the term agricultural and with the construction of 
that term as used in other employment statutes.64   
The Eleventh Circuit, the only court of appeals to review the Board’s 
interpretation of the domestic servant exclusion, has twice upheld the 
Board’s narrow construction of that exemption.65  In both cases, the court 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Murphy Timber Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 487, 491-92 n.5 (1941). 
 58 Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1274-75 (1938). 
 59 See, e.g., Constitution Publ’g Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 105, 112 (1941); Park Floral Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 
403, 415 (1940); Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275. 
 60 Stockholders Publ’g Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1022-24 n.33 (1941). 
 61 29 U.S.C. § 2(3) (1935). 
 62 Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 399 (1996). 
 63 Great W. Mushroom Co., 27 N.L.R.B. 352, 359 nn.9-11 (1940). 
 64 E. Clemens Horst, Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1199-1202 nn.7-14 (1940); see also Park Floral Co., 
19 N.L.R.B. at 413-14 nn.24-26 (finding that greenhouse workers, including growers and assistant 
growers, were not, among other things, agricultural workers within the meaning of the Act and therefore 
were statutory employees entitled to the Act’s protections). 
 65 See Shore Club Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. NLRB, 400 F.3d 1336, 1338-40 (11th Cir. 2005) (mainte-
nance and cleaning employees who work for the owners of individual home units within a condominium 
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rejected the employer’s attempt to expand the exclusion to maintenance 
workers and housekeepers of condominium units. 
The family exemption is expressly limited to the parent or spouse of a 
covered employer.66  Although later Boards have interpreted the family   
exemption to include the parent or spouse of a majority shareholder in a 
closely held corporation,67 reviewing courts have chastised the Board for 
attempting to expand that exemption beyond the plain language.68  The 
Board will however review on a case-by-case basis whether other close 
family workers, who are statutory employees, should be excluded from 
bargaining units under Section 9(b) of the Act.  This distinction is signifi-
cant.  Although such close relatives might be appropriately excluded from a 
particular bargaining unit because the family member’s interests are more 
closely aligned with management’s than with those of the bargaining unit 
members’,69 these family-employees still retain the statutory rights of work-
ers to band together for mutual aid or protection or in other concerted     
activity.70  Accordingly, the family-employer cannot, for example, discharge 
them or otherwise discriminate against them because of their concerted 
activity. 
                                                                                                                           
and in the common areas of that condominium are not domestic services within the meaning of NLRA 
Section 2(3)); NLRB v. Imperial House Condo., Inc., 831 F.2d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
housekeepers working for a condominium association are not exempted from the NLRA’s coverage 
because they are not domestic servants within the meaning of NLRA Section 2(3)); Ankh Servs., 243 
N.L.R.B. 478, 480 & n.17 (1979) (noting that Congress intended only to exclude “domestic servants” 
from the “in the domestic service of any family or person at his home” exemption).   
 66 29 U.S.C. § 2(3) (2006); see also Mercy Hosp. of Buffalo v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 661, 666 n.2 
(1982) (noting the narrowness of the family exception and further noting that “courts have refused 
automatically to exclude a principal shareholder’s child or spouse under section 2(3)”) (citing Linn Gear 
Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1979)); Butchers Union, Local No. 120, Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 160 N.L.R.B. 1465, 1468 n.3 (1966). 
 67 Cerni Motor Sales, 201 N.L.R.B. 918, 918 (1973). 
 68 See, e.g., NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Prods., Inc., 466 F.2d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 1972) (rejecting 
the Board’s Foam Rubber City formulation for determining the children/spouse exception as being too 
“elastic”).   
 69 The Board does not automatically exclude family workers on the basis of that relationship; nor 
does the Board exclude such family workers from bargaining units “absent evidence that because of 
such relationship [the family worker] enjoys a special status which allies his interests with those of 
management.”  Atlanta Daily World, 179 N.L.R.B. 999, 1007 (1969) (quoting Int’l Metal Prods. Co., 
107 N.LR.B. 65, 67 (1953)) (holding that section 2(3)’s family exemption did not extend to the nephews 
of general manager and editor of daily newspaper and that the nephews should not be excluded from the 
bargaining unit because the evidence failed to show that the nephews lacked a community of interest 
with the other bargaining unit employees”); see also Allen Servs. Co., 314 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1062 & n.9 
(1994) 
 70 See, e.g., Caravelle Wood Prods., Inc., 466 F.2d at 678-79 (discussing this issue). 
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B. The Wagner Board’s Broad Construction of the Plain-Language       
Definition of Employee Coupled with the Wagner Board’s Narrow 
Construction of the Limited Exemptions to that Definition Paved the 
Way for the Taft-Hartley Statutory Amendments  
1. The Wagner Board, With Supreme Court Approval, Concluded 
that the Wagner Act Protected Minor Foremen and Independent        
Contractors 
Reviewing courts ultimately concluded that the Board’s broad inter-
pretation of the statutory term employee and narrow construction of the 
three main statutory exemptions were reasonable and thus generally upheld 
those interpretations and the Board’s application of its reasonable interpre-
tation of the law to the facts of the particular case.  But employers contin-
ued to challenge these interpretations, which tended to benefit workers by 
bringing more rather than fewer of them under the NLRA’s protective    
cover. 
Employers were particularly concerned about union infiltration among 
foremen.71  The blossoming of union membership during the Wagner era,72 
which resulted in collective bargaining agreements with improved wages 
and other terms and conditions of employment, also led to discontent 
among front-line supervisors, whose status and economic position began to 
deteriorate compared with those they supervised.73  This “led in the early 
1940’s to large-scale unionization by manufacturing foremen.”74 
Employers were threatened by this large-scale unionization among 
manufacturing foremen. According to labor scholar Professor Marley 
Weiss, in the employer’s view: 
[U]nionization threatened to shift the allegiance of foremen to the 
working class, depriving employers of loyal front-line agents and    
potentially impairing operational efficiency.  Manufacturing firms   
depended on their foremen to enforce discipline and productivity in 
harsh, unsafe, repetitive assembly line jobs.  Union-based loyalty to 
the interests of the workers could subvert the supervisor’s enforcement 
of policies aimed at extracting increased productivity and discipline.  
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Weiss, supra note 44, at 355-59.  
 72 Professor Weiss reports that “[u]nion membership quintupled from three million to fifteen 
million between 1935 and 1947.”  See id. at 356 (citing sources).  Among the sources cited therein, see 
generally DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
STRUGGLE 157 (2d ed. 1993). 
 73 See Weiss, supra note 44, at 356.  
 74 See id. 
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Unionized foremen also might strike with the rank and file, or honor 
their picket lines.75 
Employers viewed unionization among foremen as a shift in loyalty 
from the ruling to the ruled class, which, in their view, directly harmed   
employer interests in productivity. 
Employer dissatisfaction with the Board’s interpretation of the       
statutory definition culminated in two cases:  Packard Motor Car Co. v. 
NLRB, where the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s conclusion that the 
statutory definition broadly included minor foreman,76 and NLRB v. Hearst 
Publications, where the Court upheld the Board conclusion that the statuto-
ry definition broadly included independent contractors.77 
In Packard Motor Car, the Supreme Court held that the Board reason-
ably concluded that foremen as a class of workers are statutory employees 
who may self-organize and band together for the purposes of collective 
bargaining or mutual aid and protection.78  The Court drew that conclusion 
in the context of deciding whether the company’s minor supervisory per-
sonnel – the general foremen, foremen, assistant foremen, and special    
assignment men – were statutory employees.79  These 1,100 minor foremen 
were themselves supervised and controlled by the company’s managers, 
which included an additional thirteen rungs above the general foremen.80 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the company’s two main 
contentions as being “at odds with [the NLRA’s] plain terms.”81  As a matter 
of statutory construction, the Court rejected the company’s contention that 
these minor foremen were not statutory employees because they met the 
statutory definition of employer, which “includes any person acting in the 
interest of the employer.”82  The Court answered that the company’s conten-
tion proved too much because “[e]very employee, from the very fact of 
employment in the master’s business, is required to act in his interest.  He 
owes to the employer faithful performance of service in his interest, the 
protection of the employer’s property in his custody or control, and all    
employees may, as to third parties, act in the interests of the employer to 
such an extent that he is liable for their wrongful acts.”83 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id.  
 76 Packard v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491-93 (1947). 
 77 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131-32 (1944). 
 78 Packard, 330 U.S. at 491. 
 79 Brief for NLRB, Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, No. 658, 1947 WL 43968, at *2-3 (U.S. 
Mar. 10, 1947). 
 80 Id. at *5-6. 
 81 Packard, 330 U.S. at 490. 
 82 Id. at 488 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2(2) (2006)). 
 83 Id. at 488-89. 
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The Court also rejected what it viewed to be the company’s central 
concern – “the undesirability of permitting foremen to organize” who might 
“combine to bargain advantages for themselves, [and] will sometimes be 
governed by interests of their own or of their fellow foremen, rather than by 
the company’s interests.”84  The Court dismissed the company’s argument 
as “rooted in the misconception that because the employer has the right to 
wholehearted loyalty in the performance of the contract of employment, the 
employee does not have the right to protect his independent and adverse 
interest in the terms of the contract itself and the conditions of work.”85 
The Court also dismissed the company’s argument that permitting 
foremen to unionize is “bad industrial policy . . . [because] it puts the union 
foreman in the position of serving two masters, divides his loyalty and 
makes generally for bad relations between management and labor.”86  The 
Court explained that it was not its function to rule on “the wisdom of the 
legislation,” implicitly inviting Congress to act if it disagreed with the 
Board’s reasonable statutory construction. 
In Hearst, the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s finding that news-
boys are “employees” of the newspapers employing them, entitling the 
newsboys to the NLRA’s protection.87  In finding that only the full-time 
fixed-spot newsboys and checkmen were statutory employees, the Board 
drew a line contrasting those workers with “bootjackers” – other workers 
who sell at varying times in varying places.88  Particularly relevant to the 
Board’s decision was the amount of control that the employer exercised 
over the full-time newsboys and checkmen:  the full-time newsboys sta-
tioned at fixed spots were under direct and close supervision of a district 
manager, who fixed the newsboy’s main selling spot, unilaterally controlled 
the number of papers the newsboy was required to take each day,           
effectively fixed the newsboys’ compensation, and prescribed the broad 
terms and conditions of the newsboys’ day in a number of ways.89 
The Court rejected, as inconsistent with creating uniform, national    
labor policy, the newspaper’s argument that the newsboys were independent 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. at 490. 
 85 Id. at 490. 
 86 Id. at 493. 
 87 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 88 Id. at 116. 
 89 Id. at 116-18.  The district managers could order the transfer of newsboys from one spot to 
another for disciplinary reasons, district managers may set hours of work and adherence to the hours is 
observed by supervisory agents of Hearst, sanction might be ordered to those that are tardy or delin-
quent.  In addition, district managers gave “helpful sales techniques” that the newsboys were expected 
to follow, such as how to display the newspaper, which headlines to emphasize, where to place adver-
tisements, among others.  Id. at 118-19. 
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contractors within the common law meaning of that term and therefore that 
they should be excluded from the NLRA’s statutory definition of            
employee.90  The Court explained that adopting a common law approach 
would lead to a “patchwork plan for securing freedom of employees’ organ-
ization and of collective bargaining” because the definition of independent 
contractor and employee were not uniform in either rule or application, as 
the company’s fallaciously approach assumed.91  
It would introduce variations into the statute’s operation as wide as the 
differences the forty-eight states and other local jurisdictions make in    
applying the distinction for wholly different purposes.  Persons who 
might be ‘employees’ in one state would be ‘independent contractors’ 
in another.  They would be within or without the statute’s protection 
depending not on whether their situation falls factually within the am-
bit Congress had in mind, but upon the accidents of the location of 
their work and the attitude of the particular local jurisdiction in casting 
doubtful cases one way or the other.  Persons working across state 
lines might fall in one class or the    other, possibly both, depending on 
whether the Board and the courts would be required to give effect to 
the law of one state or of the adjoining one, or to that of each in rela-
tion to the portion of the work done within its borders.92 
Simply put, the newspaper’s approach was inconsistent with Con-
gress’s intention “to solve a national problem on a national scale.”93 
The Court also rejected the newspaper’s argument that independent 
contractors should be exempted from the statutory definition of employee 
on grounds that such a narrow construction of the statutory term employee 
was inconsistent with “the history, terms and purpose of the legislation.”94  
In the Court’s view, “Congress . . . was not thinking solely of the immediate 
technical relation of employer and employee” when drafting the NLRA.95   
It had in mind at least some other persons than those standing in the 
proximate legal relation of employee to the particular employer in-
volved in the labor dispute.  It cannot be taken, however, that the pur-
pose was to   include all other persons who may perform service for 
another or was to ignore entirely legal classifications made for other 
purposes.  Congress had in mind a wider field than the narrow tech-
                                                                                                                           
 90 Id. at 120. 
 91 Id. at 123.   
 92 Id.   
 93 Id.   
 94 Id. at 124.   
 95 Id.   
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nical legal relation of ‘master and servant,’ as the common law had 
worked this out in all its variations, and at the same time a narrower 
one than the entire area of rendering service to others.  The question 
comes down therefore to how much was included of the intermediate 
region between what is clearly and unequivocally ‘employment,’ by 
any appropriate test, and what is as clearly entrepreneurial enterprise 
and not employment.96 
By concluding that it would uphold the Board findings if its determi-
nations “ha[ve] warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law,” the 
Court once again implicitly invited Congress to amend the NLRA if it    
disagreed with the Board’s reasonable construction of the statutory terms.97 
2. The Pre-Taft-Hartley Debate Over Who Qualifies As an Employee 
Essentially Is a Fight Over Whether to Maintain the Hierarchical 
Organization of Post-War Industry and a Rigid Labor-
Management Binary 
Some members of Congress were outraged about Supreme Court deci-
sional law that affirmed the Board’s view that minor supervisory personnel 
and independent contractors were statutory employees who possessed    
Section 7 rights.98  Those congressional members wanted to “deprive[] the 
Board of jurisdiction over [those categories of workers].”99  The legislative 
history suggests several reasons for removing the Board’s jurisdiction over 
these workers.  
The House Report gave three reasons for removing foremen and other 
supervisory personnel from the NLRA – all consistent with a world view 
that believes in a labor-management binary and that the loyalty of minor 
supervisory personnel is necessary to maximize productivity in the manu-
facturing-industrial economic sector.  The Report explained that unionizing 
supervisory personnel (1) “would be bad for output, which the act was    
intended to promote,” (2) “bad for the rank and file,” and (3) “bad for the 
foremen themselves.”100  The House Report supported its first contention – 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Id. at 124-25. 
 97 Id. at 131.  This deference that the Court shows to the Board in interpreting the Act is later 
understood and articulated as Chevron deference. 
 98 Disclaimer:  The legislative history recounted here is not meant to support any particular con-
struction of the Taft-Hartley amendments.  Rather, this history merely helps create a context for better 
understanding the passionately held views of those management advocates who felt that the Wagner Act 
was a cure for labor-management imbalance worse than the disease.  
 99 H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 304 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 304 (1948). 
 100 Id. 
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that “unionizing supervisors . . . is inconsistent with the purpose of the act 
to increase output of goods that move in the stream of commerce, and thus 
to increase its flow”101 – with a statement attributed to Henry Ford II “that 
productivity declined after the foremen organized [at the Ford Motor Co. in 
November 1942].”102  By contrast, the report dismissed with no discussion 
the “claim[]” of the foreman association’s president that “productivity was 
high in plants that it had organized.”103 
The House Report’s remaining two contentions appear to be heavily 
grounded in the class-based ideology104 that all workers fall into the labor-
management binary and that any good unions might do can be done only in 
support of the rank and file.  Indeed, the Report’s use of the term “rank and 
file” itself suggests the bifurcation of the workplace into subordinates and 
leaders.  Along these lines, the House Report supported its second conten-
tion – that unionizing supervisors is bad for the rank and file – on grounds 
that “[i]t is inconsistent with the policy of Congress to assure to workers 
freedom from domination or control by their supervisors in their organizing 
or bargaining activities.”105  But the Report fails to explain how unionizing 
supervisors is inconsistent with that policy, stating only that the two policies 
are “inconsistent.”   
On the flip side, the House Report supported its third contention – that 
unionizing supervisors is bad for the foremen themselves – on two grounds.  
First, embedded in the House Report, in a manner reminiscent of Plato’s 
gold, silver, and bronze people,106 is a stark class-based argument for why 
unionization is bad for foremen: 
Supervisors are management people.  They have distinguished them-
selves in their work.  They have demonstrated their ability to take care 
of themselves without depending upon the pressure of collective      
action.  No one forced them to become supervisors.  They abandoned 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Id. at 305, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT 1947, at 305 (1948).   
 102 Id.  
 103 Id.   
 104 Marion Crain and Ken Matheny make a similar point in “Labor’s Divided Ranks”: Privilege 
and the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542 (1998-99).   
 105 H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 305 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 305 (1948).   
 106 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK III 177-80 (Benjamin Jowett trans., The Heritage Press 1944) 
(arguing that the ideal state comprises three classes:  rulers or guardians (those with gold souls), warri-
ors (those with silver souls), and the people, who were farmers and craftsmen (those with bronze souls)).  
Plato’s system is not a binary but a tripartition.  Nevertheless, the analogy holds for all the reasons 
presented in this paper.  As explained infra, under the Taft-Hartley philosophy, supervisors (silver peo-
ple) must be exempted from the NLRA because managers (those who represent the interests of the gold 
people) are entitled to the loyalty of certain workers. 
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the “collective security” of the rank and file voluntarily, because they 
believed the opportunities thus opened to them to be more valuable to 
them than such “security.”  It seems wrong, and it is wrong, to subject 
people of this kind, who have demonstrated their initiative, their ambi-
tion and their ability to get ahead, to the leveling processes of         
seniority, uniformity and standardization that the Supreme Court rec-
ognizes as being fundamental principles of unionism. . . . It is wrong 
for the foremen, for it discourages the things in them that made them 
foremen in the first place.  For the same reason, that it discourages 
those best qualified to get ahead, it is wrong for industry, and particu-
larly for the future strength and productivity of our country.107 
The preceding excerpt shows that the Report doesn’t even bother to 
hide this class ideology, which assumes that union members are interested 
in “the leveling processes of seniority, uniformity and standardization,”108 at 
the expense of excluding rewards for workers’ achievement.  In the view of 
the Report’s drafters, “it is wrong[] to subject” supervisors and foremen – 
“people of this kind, who have demonstrated their initiative, their ambition 
and their ability to get ahead” – to the union’s leveling process.109  It is 
“wrong” to subject supervisors or foremen – even low-level supervisors to 
the possibility of unionism because unionism “discourages the things in 
them that made them foremen in the first place.”110  The Report leaps from 
that conclusion to the following one: for the same reasons that unionism 
“discourages those best qualified to get ahead, it is wrong for industry, and 
particularly for the future strength and productivity of our country.”111 
This part of the House Report reveals the fundamental values reflected 
in a capitalist-based economy: a world view that highly values competition 
as the best method for promoting productivity and a world view that      
believes in the existence of the meritocracy.  Even if promoting these values 
actually achieves productivity and meritocracy (a statement I take issue 
with), the threshold fallacies with this argument are that those selected to be 
supervisors are inherently more worthy, that unionism inevitably results in 
leveling, and that leveling is bad in all cases.  The ideology underlying the 
Report then is fundamentally inconsistent with a workplace policy that dig-
nifies workers or promotes their autonomy.112 
                                                                                                                           
 107 H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 307-08 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 307-08 (1948).   
 108 Id.   
 109 Id.   
 110 Id.   
 111 Id.   
 112 See generally The Autonomous Dignified Worker, supra note 29. 
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The House Report also argues that unionizing foremen is bad for 
foremen because it is bad for employers.  This argument conflates what is 
good for foremen with what is good for the employer, an argument that 
echoes the employer’s fallacy-embedded protestations in Packard Motor 
that foremen were not statutory employees because they were employers.  
The Report explains that unionizing foremen “is inconsistent with our    
policy to protect the rights of employers.”  The Report then particularizes 
that right:  “employers . . . are entitled to loyal representatives in the 
plants.”113  It explains that employers need their supervisors to be autono-
mous or independent from rank-and-file workers, “but when . . . foremen 
unionize, even in a union that claims to be ‘independent’ of the union of the 
rank and file, they are subject to influence and control by the rank and file 
union, and, instead of their bossing the rank and file, the rank and file   
bosses them.”114 
There also appears to be a fourth reason for removing foremen from 
the Board’s jurisdiction – fear of unionization itself and the consolidation of 
power among the working class.  In particular, the Report expresses con-
cern with the growth of unionization among foremen and the implications 
of that growth.  The purpose of the Labor Act “was to protect workers and 
their unions against foremen, not to unionize foremen.”115  “In few trades, 
and in none of the great mass-producing industries, were foremen          
unionized.  It was not until about [seven] years after Congress passed the 
Labor Act that anyone asked the Labor Board to establish a unit composed 
of supervisors.”116  The Report also expresses concern about the implication 
of such growth in foremen unions:   
The committee received in evidence about 200 letters that the Fore-
man’s Association had exchanged with unions of the rank and file.  
They showed a closer and more intimate relation between the associa-
tion and the unions of men the foremen supervise than one ordinarily 
finds between unions affiliated together in the same federation, and a 
                                                                                                                           
 113 H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 305, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 305 (1948).   
 114 Id.   
 115 Id. at 304, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 304 (1948); see also Weiss, supra note 44, at 355-59. 
 116 H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 305, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947, at 304 (1948) (citing Md. Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733, 737 
(1943)). 
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subservience of the association of unions of the rank and file that is   
rare among unions.117 
Accordingly, unionization among foremen must be stopped because it re-
sults in ruling class subservience to the working class. 
The Senate Report supports its contention that unionizing supervisors 
is bad for employers and bad for workers by arguing that when supervisors 
are unionized they are less likely to do their job of disciplining the work-
force and keeping the workers safe: 
The folly of permitting a continuation of this policy is dramatically il-
lustrated by what has happened in the captive mines of the Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp. since supervisory employees were organized by 
the United Mine Workers under the protection of the act.  Disciplinary 
slips issued by the underground supervisors in these mines have fallen 
off by two-thirds and the accident rate in each mine has doubled.118 
In the views of these committee members, supervisory unionization was 
causally linked to lax discipline and decreased safety – a variation on the 
subservience and productivity arguments. 
Reading the House and Senate rationales together suggests that some 
members of Congress were concerned with establishing a “balance”      
between labor and management.  Although that balance may be upset when 
workers (bronze people) have no means for expressing themselves and 
therefore they are entitled to organize and protect themselves from the    
excesses of management coercion symptomatic of an industrialized society 
(Wagner philosophy), that balance is also upset when management itself (in 
this case, silver people)119 organizes (Taft-Hartley philosophy).  The expla-
nation for this argument is two-fold.  First, when supervisors or managers 
unionize, they exacerbate rather than restore the balance of power between 
rank and file and management by tipping the balance too much in favor of 
the working class through class consolidation.  Second, when supervisors 
unionize they harm business both by decreasing productivity and by identi-
fying with the wrong class of workers – the rank and file – rather than with 
the employer’s business interests.  “If management is to be free to manage 
American industry as in the past and to produce the goods on which        
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. at 306, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 306 (1948). 
 118 S. REP. NO. 105, at 4 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 410 (1948). 
 119 Some managers, such as Chief Executive Officers and other high-level officials may very well 
be gold people.  I am concerned here, not with those who make policy, but the silver soldiers who im-
plement policy.  This article does not attempt to figure how to draw that line. 
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depends our strength in war and our standard of living always,” the Report 
concludes that: 
Congress must exclude foremen from the operation of the Labor Act, 
not only when they organize into unions of the rank and file and into 
unions affiliated with those of the rank and file, but also when they 
organize into unions that claim to be independent of the unions of the 
rank and file.120 
Unlike the supervisory exemption’s legislative history, the independent 
contractor exemption’s history does not attempt to rationalize the line     
between the protected statutory employee and unprotected independent 
contractor.  Rather, the legislative record suggests that some members of 
Congress believed that there was a natural line between those two classes of 
workers and that the Board, the Supreme Court, or both acted arbitrarily in 
disregarding those categories.  Indeed, immediately prior to attacking the 
Board’s construction of the statutory definition of employee, the Report 
sarcastically characterizes that construction as dimwitted: “An ‘employee’, 
according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as the courts 
have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone, with 
the exception of members of the National Labor Relations Board, means 
someone who works for another for hire.”121 
The assumption – that the definitions of employee and independent 
contractor were patently obvious (a bad assumption, in my view) – freed 
Congress to focus its attack on the Board for giving (and the Court for    
endorsing) “far-fetched meanings” to plain words with “ordinary         
meanings,” such as independent contractor.122  The House Report viewed its 
mission as “correct[ing] what the Board has done, and what the Supreme 
Court, putting misplaced reliance upon the Board’s expertness, has        
approved.”123  That Report proceeds not so much to analyze where particu-
lar Board decisions actually assert jurisdiction too broadly over the wrong 
classes of workers but rather to question the Board’s rationality.  In particu-
lar, given the Board’s alleged inability to discern the “natural” demarcation 
                                                                                                                           
 120 H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 306 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 306 (1948) (emphasis added). 
 121 The Report further explains that line as follows: There is and always has been a “big differ-
ence” between employees, who “work for wages or salary under direct supervision,” and independent 
contractors, who “undertake to do a job for a price, decide how the work will be done, usually hire 
others to do the work, and depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the difference between 
what they pay for goods, materials, and labor and what they receive for the end result, that is, upon 
profits.”  Id. at 309 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 309 (1948).   
 122 Id.   
 123 Id.   
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between employee and independent contractor, the Report focuses instead 
on the need to remedy the excessive deference afforded to the Board’s    
analysis of this question. 
It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, authorized 
the Board to give to every word in the act whatever meaning it 
wished.124 
There has been some dissatisfaction with what has been viewed as too 
great a tendency on the part of the courts not to disturb Board find-
ings, even though they may be based on questions of mixed law and 
fact.125 
In many instances, deference on the part of the courts to specialized 
knowledge that is supposed to inhere in administrative agencies has 
led the courts to acquiesce in decisions of the Board even when the 
findings concerned mixed issues of law and fact.126 
The Senate Report was similarly concerned with the rejection of the 
common law test for distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors: 
[T]he Supreme Court has . . . held that the ordinary tests of the law of 
agency could be disregarded by the Board in determining if petty     
occupational groups were “employees” within the meaning of the    
Labor Relations Act.  The Court consequently refused to consider the 
question whether certain categories of persons whom the Board had 
deemed to be “employees” might not, as a matter of law, have been 
independent contractors.  The legal effect of the amendment therefore 
is merely to make it clear that the question whether or not a person is 
an employee is always a question of law, since the term is not meant 
to embrace persons outside that category under the general principles 
of the law of agency.127 
The Senate Report thus envisions a tightly constrained Board, tethered 
by law to distinguish between independent contractor and employee status 
along “natural” lines.  What the Report does not seem to anticipate is that 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Id.   
 125 Id. at 432, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 432 (1948) (citing among others NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 
(1944)).   
 126 Id. at 559-60, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 559-60 (1948) (citing among others Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111).   
 127 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, SENATE (June 5, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947, at 1537 (1948) (citing Hearst Publ’ns, 
Inc., 322 U.S. 111).   
2010] The Vanishing Employee 519 
 
the common law agency test is so elastic that the question whether a      
particular worker is a statutory employee or independent contractor will 
remain largely within the Board’s discretion.   
C. The Taft-Hartley Statutory Amendments Maintained the Affirmative 
Definition of Employee but Broadened that Definition’s Statutory      
Exemptions To Exclude Supervisors and Independent Contractors 
1. For  Over  a  Half  Century,  the  Board,  with  Court  Approval, 
Continued to Broadly Construe the Affirmative Aspect of the   
Statutory Definition 
In 1947, Congress, over President Truman’s veto, amended NLRA 
Section 2(3) in response to Packard Motor Car Company and Hearst Publi-
cations.  The affirmative aspect of the definition remained unchanged.   
And the Board, with court approval, has continued to construe the     
affirmative aspect of the definition broadly in concert with the plain lan-
guage.  Indeed, the coming years witnessed the broadest construction of the 
affirmative aspect of the statutory definition to date.  In the 1960s, the   
Supreme Court twice affirmed the status of strikers as statutory              
employees.128  In 1978, in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court upheld 
the Board’s view that well-paid employees engaged in the Section 7 pro-
tected activity of distributing pro-minimum-wage literature at the jobsite 
were statutory employees because the plain language of Section 2(3) ex-
pressly declares that employees “‘shall not be limited to the employees of a 
particular employer.’”129  In 1984, in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme 
Court held that the striking breadth of Section 2(3) squarely covered un-
documented workers.130  In 1995, in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 
the Supreme Court, by unanimous decision, upheld the Board’s reasonable 
conclusion that paid union organizers, or salts, were statutory employees.131  
When coupling that conclusion with the long-held conclusion that job    
applicants also are statutory employees,132 reviewing courts have upheld the 
Board’s determination that an employer may not discriminate in the hiring 
of qualified workers who inform the employer that they intend to lawfully 
                                                                                                                           
 128 NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 
221 (1963) (“[Section] 2(3) preserves to strikers their unfilled positions and status as employees during 
the pendency of a strike.”). 
 129 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)).  In light of the 
facts of this case, which expressly protects workers as a class to protect other members of the working 
class, I have dubbed it the “comrades-of-the-world-unite-case.” 
 130 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984). 
 131 516 U.S. 85, 98 (1995).   
 132 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191-92 (1941).   
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unionize that employer’s workforce.  The only limit to the affirmative     
aspect of the statutory definition came in 1971, when, in Chemical Workers 
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., the Supreme Court held that retired persons 
were not statutory employees because they literally do not “work for      
another for hire.”133 
It is now uncontroversial that the Board, not the Courts, have the pri-
mary task of determining “the contours of the term ‘employee.’”134 It is also 
long-settled that, when undertaking this task, the Board uniformly interprets 
the term “employee” in the “broad generic sense” to “include members of 
the working class generally.”135  And every Board, until the Bush II Board, 
continued to apply this expansive interpretation of the affirmative aspect of 
Section 2(3) with court approval. 
2. Notwithstanding Supreme Court Approval of a Broadly Construed 
Affirmative Definition of Employee, the Bush II Board Reversed 
Course and Restricted the Definition By Reading Certain Classes 
of Employees – Salts, Students and the Severely Disabled – Out of 
the NLRA’s Protective Cover136 
Notwithstanding the long-standing, court-approved precedent broadly 
construing the affirmative aspects of the plain language of NLRA Section 
2(3), the Bush II Board chose to read several subclasses of employees out 
of the NLRA and created a new test for reading out many more workers.  
As a threshold matter, the Bush II Board proclaimed that, despite the near-
universal breadth of the plain statutory language, it “ha[d] the discretion to 
determine whether it would effectuate national labor policy to extend col-
lective-bargaining rights to [a particular] category of employees,” and that 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971).  
 134 Id. at 167; see also NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1995); Holly 
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1996); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984); 
Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 304 (1977); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 
111, 130 (1944); Local No. 207, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 706 (1963); 
NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1947). 
 135 Briggs Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 569, 570 (1947); Little Rock Crate & Basket Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 
1406, 1406 (1977); Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701, 707 (1975); L.D. Brinkman Se., 261 N.L.R.B. 
204, 210 (1984); see also W.D.D.W. Commercial Sys. & Invs., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 260, 269 n.3 (2001).  
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself recognized the class-based definition of employee as early as 1941 
when it wrote: “the reference is to ‘employees’, unqualified and undifferentiated.  To circumscribe the 
general class, ‘employees’, we must find authority either in the policy of the Act or in some specific 
delimiting provision of it.”  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191 (1941). 
 136 Portions of the discussion in this section were taken from and originally published in two of my 
recent articles: The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recognition; and September Massacre: 
The Latest Battle in the War on Workers’ Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act.  See generally 
Union Repression, supra note 13; September Massacre, supra note 13. 
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it was “not compelled to include [that category of employees] in a bargain-
ing unit if the Board determines it would not effectuate the purposes and 
policies of the Act to do so.”137  Applying that rationale, the Bush II Board 
declined to exercise authority over several subclasses of employees, most 
notably salts,138 graduate teaching or research assistants,139 and severely 
disabled workers.140 
In the most recent case, Toering Electric Co., the Bush II Board held 
that salts (i.e., paid union organizers who seek employment with an       
employer for the purpose of organizing that employer’s workforce)141 are 
not statutory employees in circumstances where the salt does not intend to 
accept a job if offered.142  The Bush II Board based its decision on several 
arguments that fly in the face of both Supreme Court precedent and other 
case precedent.  As an initial matter, the Bush II Board, mischaracterizing 
Supreme Court precedent that discusses the NLRA’s strikingly broad defini-
tion of employee,143 asserted that it need not “extend[] the protections of 
statutory employees to all other workers who are not specifically            
excluded”144 from the statute’s definition.  The Bush II Board then cited its 
own relatively recent cases to justify its argument that such a broad defini-
tion of employee would be contrary to precedent, ignoring the fact that 
more longstanding precedent from previous Boards would dictate a differ-
ent result.145   
After narrowly interpreting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB – a Supreme 
Court case famously (and broadly) holding that job applicants are treated as 
statutory employees under the Act146 – the Bush II Board questioned    
whether “job applicants who lack a genuine interest in seeking an employ-
                                                                                                                           
 137 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 492 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 138 Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225 (2007). 
 139 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 483.   
 140 Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (2004). 
 141 Some believe that the term salt “may be derived from the phrase ‘salting a mine,’ which is the 
artificial introduction of metal or ore into a mine by subterfuge to create the false impression that the 
material was naturally occurring.”  Tualatin Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 84 F.3d 1202, 1203 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).  
See also Victor J. Van Bourg & Ellyn Moscowitz, Salting the Mines: The Legal and Political Implica-
tions of Placing Paid Union Organizers in the Employer's Workplace, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 
5 (1998). 
 142 Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 225. 
 143 See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (“The breadth of [Section] 2(3)’s 
definition is striking: the Act squarely applies to ‘any employee.’”); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 
Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 91 (1995) (upholding the Board’s “broad, literal interpretation” of Section 2(3) as 
consistent with the NLRA’s plain language, its statutory purposes, and interpretative case law).  
 144 Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 228. 
 145 Id. (citing Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982 (2004); Brown Univ., 342 
N.L.R.B. 483, 488 (2004)).  The Board also cites a Clinton Board decision, WBAI Pacifica Foundation, 
328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1274-75 (1999), a case easily distinguishable as involving unpaid staff positions. 
 146 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941). 
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ment relationship are not [statutory] employees.”147  The Bush II Board held 
that “an applicant for employment entitled to protection as a Section 2(3) 
employee is someone genuinely interested in seeking to establish an      
employment relationship with the employer,” and that “the General Coun-
sel bears the ultimate burden of proving an individual’s genuine interest in 
seeking to establish an employment relationship with the employer.”148  The 
Bush II Board thereby circumvented the Supreme Court cases Phelps 
Dodge Corp. and NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.149 by creating an 
unpersuasive distinction between job applicants who genuinely seek an 
employment relationship with an employer and those who do not.   
The Bush II Board based its holding on several dubious factors.  First, 
with little discussion of the NLRA’s purposes or its legislative history, it 
viewed a “relationship between an employer and a putative job applicant 
who has no genuine interest in working for that employer” as not having 
“the economic relationship contemplated and protected by the Act.”150    
Ignoring its own question – whether such individuals are statutory employ-
ees – the Board then rested its conclusion on its remedial authority, arguing 
that statutory policies against “windfall and punitive backpay awards” sup-
ported its holding.151   
The Board next mischaracterized the role of salts as those who seek 
only to provoke unfair labor practices by applying to employers who are 
hostile to unionization.  Using that mischaracterization, the Board, citing 
Jefferson Standard – a Supreme Court case holding that employees engaged 
in disloyal product disparagement lose the NLRA’s protection152 – declared 
salts disloyal because their “conduct manifests a fundamental conflict of 
interests ab initio between the employer’s interest in doing business and the 
applicant’s interest in disrupting or eliminating this business.”153  As my 
colleague Professor Bob Bastress remarked to me, that quote speaks vol-
umes about the Bush II Board’s attitude toward unions.  No rational union, 
whose interests are in maintaining and increasing job opportunities for its 
members, is out to “eliminat[e] business.” 
The Bush II Board then tried to bolster its argument when it explained 
that denying the NLRA’s protection to workers involved in these litigation-
                                                                                                                           
 147 Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 229. 
 148 Id. at 228 (emphasis added). 
 149 516 U.S. 85, 92, 96-98 (1995) (unanimously upholding the Board’s interpretation of NLRA 
Section 2(3) as including paid union organizers). 
 150 Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 228. 
 151 Id. at 229. 
 152 NLRB v.  Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 
464, 472 (1953). 
 153 Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 231. 
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based salting campaigns was consistent with Town & Country Electric, the 
Supreme Court case that expressly rejected the argument that salts are    
inherently disloyal.154  The Court explained:  
[The Company] argues that, when the paid union organizer serves the 
union . . . the organizer is acting adversely to the company. . . .  Thus, 
it concludes, the worker must be the servant (i.e., the “employee”) of 
the union alone. . . .  [That] argument fails . . . because . . . it lacks suf-
ficient support in common law.  The Restatement’s hornbook rule (to 
which the quoted commentary is appended) says that a “person may 
be the servant of two masters . . . at one time as to one act, if the ser-
vice  to  one  does  not  involve  abandonment  of  the  service  to  the  
other.”155 
It is noteworthy that the Bush II Board essentially disenfranchised 
salts in the face of the Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Town & 
Country Electric and circuit precedent unanimously upholding backpay 
awards to salts.156 
The Bush II Board’s willingness to read a certain subclass of          
employees out of the NLRA’s protection was part of an administrative trend 
toward restricting worker access to the NLRA’s fundamental protections by 
narrowing the statutory definition of employee.  For example, the Bush II 
Board held that teaching and research assistants at private universities are 
students and therefore are not statutory employees.157  The Bush II Board 
also held that “severely disabled” employees working as janitors are not 
statutory employees because their employment was primarily rehabilitative 
rather than economic.158   
                                                                                                                           
 154 Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 92-98 (upholding the Board’s interpretation of NLRA 
Section 2(3) as including paid union organizers). 
 155 Id. at 93-95 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1957) (emphasis in the 
original)). 
 156 NLRB v. Ferguson Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941)); see also Tualatin Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 714 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(upholding backpay award to salt); Aneco Inc. v. NLRB, 285 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding back-
pay award to salt but cutting back on the amount of that award).  
 157 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004).  For a powerful discussion of just how destructive 
the Brown decision is, see Ellen Dannin, Understanding How Employees’ Rights To Organize Under the 
National Labor Relations Act Have Been Limited: The Case of Brown University, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 
FOR L. & POL. (2008), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Dannin%20Issue%20Brief.pdf.  To be fair, for the 
past several decades, the Board has oscillated on the question whether graduate and teaching assistants 
are statutory employees.  But the discussion was limited to those student workers.  The Bush II Board 
has broadened the discussion.  
 158 Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (2004). 
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It is also significant that the Bush II Board chose to exclude employees 
by category rather than on a case-by-case basis.159  The Bush II Board    
readily admits that its decision in Brown University was based on policy.  
But rather than identifying even a single labor policy that its decision effec-
tuated, the Board elaborates on a nonlabor policy: “[D]eclining to extend 
collective-bargaining rights to students who perform services at their educa-
tional institutions, that are directly related to their educational program” is 
based on the “‘simple and straightforward’” distinction between workers 
who are “‘primarily . . . students’” and those who are “‘primarily . . . em-
ployees.’”160  Based on that distinction, the Board injected the following test 
into the statutory definition of employee:  Whether the relationship between 
the worker and the employer is “predominantly . . . economic in nature.”161  
This test is applied in each of the three cases of categorical exclusion: (1) 
graduate teaching assistants are primarily students, not workers in a pre-
dominantly economic relationship with an employer; (2) disabled workers 
are not employees to the extent that they are in a primarily rehabilitative, 
rather than economic, relationship with their employer; and (3) salts are not 
statutory employees to the extent that they do not intend to create an eco-
nomic relationship with their employer.   
With that test, the Bush II Board categorically excludes these three 
worker classifications.  But that test – only those whose relationship is pre-
dominantly economic in nature are protected when they organize for mutual 
aid or protection – strikes a decisive blow at the core of class conscious-
ness.  If the supervisory and independent contractor exemptions were the 
first and second blows, then this is the third-wave strike at dividing the 
working class. 
The Bush II Board’s construction of the statutory term employee – one 
that injects as a condition of statutory protection the intent (or capacity) to 
create a predominantly economic relationship with an employer – is not a 
reasonable construction of NLRA Section 2(3).  To paraphrase the Court in 
Office Employees International Union, Local No. 11 v. NLRB – where it 
struck down the Board’s categorical exclusion of a subcategory of union 
employers under NLRA Section 2(2) – such an “arbitrary blanket exclusion 
of employe[e]s as a class is beyond the power of the Board.”162  As with the 
Board’s interpretation of the statutory term employer, not only is the 
Bush II Board’s construction of the statutory term employee contrary to the 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Dannin, supra note 157 (discussing the lack of authority for this action). 
 160 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 489 (quoting St. Clare’s Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 
(1977)). 
 161 Id. at 489; accord Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. at 984. 
 162 Office Employees Int’l Union, Local No. 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 318 (1957). 
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broad definition that includes all employees except those that are expressly 
exempted, but that narrow statutory construction also allows the Board to 
renounce jurisdiction over an entire category of employees, all of whom are 
important segments of American work life.163 
But even assuming that the NLRA’s broad statutory definition does not 
pose a legal obstacle to the Bush II Board’s test, it remains difficult to    
imagine what labor policy is actually effectuated by that test.  Narrowing 
the definition of employee – by requiring employees to intend only (or at 
least primarily) to create an economic relationship with their employers – 
does not promote collective bargaining between those nonemployee-
workers and their employers.  Nor does it do anything to equalize bargain-
ing power between those nonemployee-workers and their employers.  Nor 
does the Bush II Board explain why nonemployee-workers, such as stu-
dents and disabled workers (both of whom are particularly vulnerable and 
powerless), are less entitled to claim the fundamental rights embodied in 
Section 7.  Nor has the Board explained how narrowing the definition of 
employee promotes industrial peace.   
Rather, the Bush II Board’s test examines the question of statutory-
employee status from the employer’s vantage point: will the employer eco-
nomically benefit from this relationship?  Ignoring the fact that employers 
always benefit economically from the labor output of their workers, the 
Bush II Board proceeds to explain that if the answer to its question is no – 
either because the worker is primarily a student, or a disabled worker whom 
the employer is helping to rehabilitate, or the worker intends to organize the 
employer’s workplace – then those workers are not employees for purposes 
of a statute intended to promote the fundamental right of workers to self-
organize  for  the  purposes  of  collective  bargaining  and  mutual  aid  or 
protection. 
On the flip side, the Bush II Board’s analysis discounts the economic 
value of the relationship to the nonemployee-worker.  For example, gradu-
ate teaching assistants accept those work assignments not merely because 
they might learn something from the job but also because they are typically 
paid for performing those jobs, which also may be bundled with tuition 
waivers or other things of economic value.  To say that all graduate teach-
ing or research assistants are therefore disenfranchised from their Section 7 
right to band together for mutual aid or protection merely because they are 
“primarily” students – and therefore have not created a relationship that is 
primarily economic in nature – hinges the worker’s right to organize and 
band together for mutual aid or protection on the employer’s interest.  That 
                                                                                                                           
 163 Id. at 318. 
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construction of the NLRA, rather than promoting the values underlining the 
Act, eviscerates them.164 
3. The Board’s and the Court’s Construction of the Two New       
Statutory Exemptions under Taft-Hartley 
a.   Overview of the New Statutory Exemptions 
Through the Taft-Hartley amendments, Congress also expanded the 
negative aspect of the definition to include: 
 any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or 
 any individual . . . in the domestic service of any family or 
person at his home, or 
 any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or 
 any individual having the status of an independent contractor, 
or 
 any individual employed as a supervisor, or 
 any individual employed by an employer subject to the Rail-
way Labor Act. . ., or 
 any individual employed . . . by any other person who is not a 
[statutory] employer.165 
Using “EE” to symbolize the term, “employee,” “ER” to symbolize 
employers, “AW” to symbolize agricultural workers, “DS” to symbolize 
domestic servants, “FAM” to symbolize the employer’s spouse and chil-
dren, “IC” to symbolize independent contractor, “SUP” to symbolize super-
visor, “RLA” to symbolize workers covered under the Railway Labor Act, 
and “GOV” to symbolize those who work for a person who is not a statuto-
ry employer (typically government employees), we can schematize the orig-
inal definition of employee in the following way: 
                                                                                                                           
 164 For a further discussion of how the Bush II Board further weakened the NLRA’s protective 
cover of salts and undocumented workers by “cut[ting] off the remedy, just in case there [wa]s any right 
remaining,” see The Autonomous Dignified Worker, supra note 29, at 61; Union Repression, supra note 
13, at 213-14 (analyzing the extent that labor law currently protects salts in light of Bush II Board deci-
sions Toering Electric and Oil Capitol and discussing the curtailment of remedies for undocumented 
workers after Hoffman Plastics); September Massacre, supra note 13; and see also Ellen Dannin, Hoff-
man Plastics as Labor Law – Equality at Last for Immigrant Workers?, 44 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 393 
(2010). 
 165 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
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EE = [any EE + ˜ (EEs of a particular ER) + strikers] – [AW + DS + FAM + 
IC + SUP + RLA + GOV] 
The Railway Labor Act and public employees are generally protected 
under other labor legislation.  Accordingly, we can reschematize our defini-
tion as follows: 
EE = [any EE + ˜ (EEs of a particular ER) + strikers] – [AW + DS + FAM + 
IC + SUP] 
At issue here are the final two categorical exemptions: independent 
contractors and supervisors. 
 
b.   The  Board  and  the  Court  Apply  Principles  of  Agency  Law  to 
Construe the Statutory Term, Independent Contractor  
 
Those favoring the independent contractor exemption may have won 
the battle but not necessarily the war, which, for reasons explained below, 
has resulted in a stalemate.166  It is now well-settled that the Board and re-
viewing courts must apply the common-law agency test for determining 
whether a worker should be classified as an employee or as an independent 
contractor.167  The Board, with court approval,168 relies primarily on the    
following multifactor analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Agency Law: 
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of 
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the perfor-
mance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to     
control. 
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an 
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, 
are considered: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may ex-
ercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupa-
tion or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, 
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a 
specialist without supervision; 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See supra text accompanying notes 258-59. 
 167 NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 
492, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 168 See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497-99. 
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(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentali-
ties, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the em-
ployer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of 
master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.169 
The Board has held that it has “no authority to change” that test, as it 
normally does when interpreting the ambiguous language in the NLRA.170  
But that does not mean that distinguishing between that statutory employee 
and independent contractor is an easy one to resolve.  Nor does it mean that 
the Board’s role as fact finder is insignificant in making that determination.  
Supreme Court decisional law instructs that the Restatement’s non-
exhaustive, ten-factor test is not easy to apply: “there is no shorthand for-
mula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, but all of the 
incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one 
factor being decisive.”171 
Other courts have elaborated on the difficulty in applying the common 
law test, which after all: 
is not merely quantitative.  We do not just count the factors that favor 
one camp, and those the other, and declare that whichever side scores 
the most points wins.  Instead, there also is a qualitative assessment to 
evaluate  which  factors  are  determinative  in  a  particular  case,  and 
why. . . . [T]his qualitative evaluation “focus[es] not upon the employ-
                                                                                                                           
 169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).  The Board has not passed on the question 
whether the Restatement (Third) of Agency has any affect on the legal test that it must apply.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006) (defining employees acting with the scope of em-
ployment for purposes of subjecting employer to vicarious liability for a tort committed by that employ-
ee); see also Reporter’s Note, cmt. a (stating that “[t]his section is a consolidated treatment of topics 
covered in several separate sections of Restatement, Second, Agency, including  . . . § 220”).  This 
question, however, is largely academic because the Restatement (Third) of Agency does not appear to 
make any real change in the ten-factor test, the purpose of which is to distinguish a servant, the perfor-
mance of whose services “is subject to the other’s control or right of control” with an independent 
contractor.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958) (defining servant), with 
§ 220(2) (1958) (defining independent contractor). 
 170 St. Joseph News Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 478 (2005). 
 171 United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 258. 
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er’s control of the means and manner of the work but instead upon 
whether the putative independent contractors have a ‘significant      
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’”172  
Such a fact-intensive test, which allows the Board to assess the “total 
factual context . . . in light of the pertinent common-law agency princi-
ples”173 gives sufficient, if not palatial, space for the Board (whose findings 
of fact are entitled to deference so long as substantial evidence on the rec-
ord as a whole supports them174) to reasonably support its conclusion one 
way or the other.  The Supreme Court in NLRB v. United Insurance Com-
pany clarified the point – that the Board’s factual findings are entitled to 
deference under the Universal Camera’s substantial evidence test – in the 
context of affirming the Board’s view that certain insurance agents were 
statutory employees, not independent contractors.  Notwithstanding review-
ing courts’ superior expertise in deciding common law questions, the Court 
recognized those courts’ (and its own) limited authority over the Board in 
stating that, even in this context, a reviewing court may not “displace the 
Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court 
would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it 
de novo.”175 
The vastness of this fact-gathering space is demonstrated in the twin 
cases of Roadway Package System, Inc.176 and Dial-A-Mattress.177  Both 
cases dealt with the question whether certain delivery truck drivers are    
statutory employees or independent contractors.  Both cases applied the 
common-law agency test for determining the distinction between a statutory 
employee and independent contractor under the NLRA.  But in cases     
decided on the same day, the Clinton Board held that the Roadway drivers 
                                                                                                                           
 172 FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 n.3. 
 173 United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 258. 
 174 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). 
 175 United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 260 (quoting Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  In NLRB v. United Insurance Co., the Court based its affirmation of the 
Board’s finding that the insurance agents were statutory employees on the following decisive factors:  
The agents “do not operate their own independent businesses, but rather perform functions that are an 
essential part of the company’s normal operations; they need not have any prior training or experience, 
but are trained by company supervisory personnel; they do business in the company’s name with con-
siderable assistance and guidance from the company and its management personnel and ordinarily sell 
only the company’s policies;” they operate under the Company’s unilaterally promulgated and con-
trolled “‘Agent’s Commission Plan;’” they “account to the company for the funds they collect under an 
elaborate and regular reporting procedure;” they receive benefits (vacation, group insurance and pension 
plan); and they “have a permanent working arrangement with the company under which they may con-
tinue so long as their performance is satisfactory.”  Id. at 259.  
 176 Roadway Package Sys., 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998). 
 177 Dial-A-Mattress, 326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998). 
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were statutory employees but the Dial-A-Mattress drivers were independent 
contractors.   
As a threshold matter, both cases clarified the Board’s analysis for    
determining independent contractor status.  In particular, relying on       
Supreme Court decisional law, the Board in Roadway clarified that, “in 
determining the distinction between an employee and an independent con-
tractor under Section 2(3) . . . [it would] apply the [Restatement’s]       
common-law agency test and consider all the incidents of the individual’s 
relationship to the employing entity.”178  The Board further clarified that, 
while the common-law test “ultimately assesses the amount or degree of 
control exercised by an employing entity over an individual,” it would    
consider all factors in determining “‘whether or not there is a sufficient 
group of favorable factors to establish the employee relationship.’”179   
Not only is no one factor decisive, but the same set of factors that was 
decisive in one case may be unpersuasive when balanced against a dif-
ferent set of opposing factors.  And though the same factor may be 
present in different cases, it may be entitled to unequal weight in each 
because the      factual background leads to an analysis that makes that 
factor more meaningful in one case than in the other.180 
Application of these principles in the two lead cases, Roadway Pack-
age System and Dial-A-Mattress, produced opposite results.  In Roadway 
Package System, the Board held that the drivers for a nationwide small-
package pickup and delivery system were statutory employees because 
those drivers – who did business in Roadway’s name, drove uniformly 
marked, custom-designed vehicles custom produced to Roadway’s specifi-
cations, and wore Roadway approved uniforms – did not operate their own 
independent businesses and did not ordinarily engage in outside business, 
but instead performed functions that were an essential and integral part of 
the company’s normal operations and under its substantial control.  To this 
end, these drivers did not need prior training or experience, but received 
training from the company and had no substantial proprietary interest be-
                                                                                                                           
 178 Roadway, 326 N.L.R.B. at 850; see id. at 849-50 (citing United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256-58; 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992)).  In each of the cases cited, the Supreme Court used the common-law 
test to distinguish between “employee” and “independent contractor” under various federal statutes.  See 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974); Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40 
(Copyright Act of 1976); United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256 (NLRA); see also NLRB v. Town & Country 
Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 92-94 (1995) (making that observation). 
 179 Roadway, 326 N.L.R.B. at 850 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958), 
cmt. c). 
 180 Roadway, 326 N.L.R.B. at 850 (quoting Austin Tupler Trucking, 261 N.L.R.B. 183, 184 
(1982)). 
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yond the investment in their trucks.  There was no significant entrepreneur-
ial opportunity for gain or loss resulting in large part from company im-
posed obstacles.  In particular, although the drivers had a contractual right 
to use their vehicles for non-company business so long as they masked the 
company’s conspicuous logo on the vehicle, no driver had done so because 
they were prohibited from conducting other commercial business during the 
business day and had other company commitments that ran into the even-
ing, making other commercial activity difficult to pursue.181   
By contrast, in Dial-A-Mattress, the Board held that the company’s 
owner-operator-drivers, who provided customer delivery services, were 
independent contractors under the common law test, primarily because 
there were less obstacles for entrepreneurial gain or loss.  Compensation 
was based on delivery with no guaranteed minimum.  Owner-operators 
were not prohibited from making additional money by performing addition-
al work for customers in exchange for separate payment and were otherwise       
allowed to use their vehicles for compensated deliveries for anyone other 
than a Dial-A-Mattress competitor.  Moreover, the owner-operators had a 
distinct identity and independence from the company.  In particular, the 
owner-operators typically owned more than one truck, which were not of 
uniform model, make, color, or size and which displayed the logo of the 
owner-operators’ company, not that of Dial-A-Mattress. The owner-
operators hired their own assistants to help with loading or even driving.  
Nor did Dial-A-Mattress control the owner-operators, who were not       
required to return to the company’s warehouse at the end of the day and 
were not trained by the company.182 
 
c.  Until Recently, the Board, with Court Resistance, Had Attempted 
     to Narrowly Construe the Term, Supervisor 
 
A very different analysis applies to the statutory supervisory exemp-
tion.  NLRA Section 2(11) defines supervisor as: 
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, 
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or 
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust 
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in con-
nection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a 
                                                                                                                           
 181 Roadway, 326 N.L.R.B. at 851-53. 
 182 Dial-A-Mattress, 326 NLRB at 885-89. 
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merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent 
judgment.183  
By contrast with the independent contractor exemption, where Con-
gress has removed court deference to the Board’s construction of that statu-
tory term, the Board receives full Chevron184 deference in its interpretation 
of Section 2(11).185  Reviewing courts readily approved the Board’s con-
struction of Section 2(11), which is a multi-part disjunctive test embedded 
into a three-part conjunctive test. 
The three-part conjunctive test provides the structure of Section 2(11) 
in the following manner.  A supervisor is any worker who: 
(1) possesses any one of the twelve enumerated powers or is author-
ized to effectively recommend such action; and  
(2) exercises that authority “in the interest of the employer;” and 
(3) is required to use “independent judgment” rather than judgment 
that is of “a merely routine or clerical nature,” when exercising that 
authority. 
This three-part test eliminates many workers from NLRA coverage.186  
After all, embedded into this test is essentially a twenty-four-part disjunc-
tive test.  If a worker possesses even one of the twelve enumerated powers 
or can effectively recommend such action, then that worker is a supervi-
sor187 unless that worker does not exercise such power in the interest of the 
employer or that worker is not required to use independent judgment when 
exercising such power.  The in-the-interest-of-the-employer prong saves 
very few workers; after all, workers are expected to act in the interest of 
                                                                                                                           
 183 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006). 
 184 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
 185 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713-14, 721-22 (2001) (recogniz-
ing that the Board is entitled to Chevron deference but ultimately rejecting the Board’s construction of 
the term “independent judgment” as not reasonable) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-44)).  
Prior to 1984, the Board also received considerable deference when interpreting the NLRA.  I call those 
cases, pre-Chevron, Chevron cases. 
 186 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 558 F.2d 205, 209-10 (4th Cir. 1977) (trucking 
company dispatchers who controlled work assigned to drivers); Local 28, Int’l Organization of Masters, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 376, 377-78 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (shipmates who issued orders to deckhands, during 
locking and docking operations and emergency situations “which required prompt and faithful obedi-
ence   for   the   protection   of   person   and   property”   exercised   independent   judgment   and   were 
supervisors). 
 187 See, e.g., Hosp. Gen. Menonita v. NLRB, 393 F.3d 263, 267 n.5 (1st Cir. 2004); Edward Street 
Daycare Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 189 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1999); Micro Pac. Dev. Inc. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 
1325, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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their employer, even if otherwise motivated.188  The question whether a 
worker is an employee or a supervisor then often turns on whether that 
worker exercises independent judgment. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the statutory language on the statu-
tory definition of employee, for decades, the Board, with court approval, 
was able to distinguish between “employees with minor supervisory du-
ties,” such as “straw bosses, leadmen, setup men, and other minor supervi-
sory employees,” who were not intended to be excluded from the coverage 
of the Act,189 and “the supervisor vested with such genuine management 
prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective        
recommendations with respect to such action.”190  Using this distinction as a 
guiding principle, the Board routinely found, mostly in the manufacturing 
or industrial sector but also among blue collar (as opposed to white collar) 
jobs, that assistant foremen,191 gang leaders,192 guard sergeants,193 dispatch 
and switchboard operators,194 workers who spent some fraction of their time 
assigning work to other workers or otherwise being in charge,195 and other 
                                                                                                                           
 188 NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1994) (nurses who exercised super-
visory powers in the interest of patient care meet the in-the-interest-of-the-employer prong of the super-
visory test).  This prong is thought not to apply to workers such as shop stewards, who might possess the 
supervisory power to adjust grievances, but does so in the interest of the bargaining unit rather than in 
the employer’s interest.  See id. at 579-80. 
 189 S. REP. NO. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947); see also, e.g., NLRB v. Quincy Steel Cast. 
Co., 200 F.2d 293, 296 (1st Cir. 1953) (citing SEN. REP. NO. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947)). 
 190 S. REP. NO. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). 
 191 NLRB v. Quincy Steel Cast. Co., 200 F.2d 293, 294 (1st Cir. 1953) (workers who spent most of 
their time as molders but who was acting superintendant when the superintendant was on vacation and 
who sporadically and infrequently assumed command position, which including the power to assign 
work and recommend hirings and discharges). 
 192 N. Va. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1962) (welder who could check the work of 
other welders and who could make recommendations about hiring and firing but whose work was also 
closely supervised). 
 193 NLRB v. Sec. Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 145-47 (5th Cir. 1967) (guards generally who 
checked vehicles and persons leaving through the main gate of company’s establishment and patrolled 
the area but who also maintained a daily activity log, kept time cards of the guards assigned to their shift 
and who relayed the captain’s instructions to the other guards); NLRB v. Merchants Police, Inc., 313 
F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1963) (working sergeants with greater responsibility than other guards). 
 194 NLRB v. City Yellow Cab Co., 344 F.2d 575(5th Cir. 1965) (taxi cab company switchboard 
operator, who directed cab drivers). 
 195 NLRB v. Don Olney Foods, Inc., 870 F.2d 1279, 1282-84 (7th Cir. 1989) (grocery store em-
ployee, who was in charge of store when manager was at lunch and every third Saturday evening ); 
NLRB v. Swift & Co., 240 F.2d 65, 66-67 (9th Cir. 1957) (plant clerks who spent most of their time 
performing clerical tasks but who also spent some time telling other employees “where to place and 
when to move certain products in the course of processing,” and who “take charge of the department for 
brief intervals when a foreman is absent” do not exercise independent judgment); Precision Fabricators, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) (machine worker and room boss who spent 80 percent of his 
time operating machines and the rest of his time assigning work to other employees did not exercise 
independent judgment). 
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minor bosses,196 were statutory employees rather than exempted supervi-
sors.  The Board, with court approval, even found employee status in some 
cases where a more highly skilled or superior worker exercised control over 
a less capable employee.197  In such cases, the courts found that “the        
employer cannot make a supervisor out of a rank and file employee simply 
by giving him the title and theoretical power to perform one or more of the 
enumerated supervisory functions.”198  
 
d.  After Kentucky River, the Bush II Board Expanded the Supervisory 
  Exemption,   Thereby   Punching  a  Gaping  Hole  in  the  Statutory 
  Definition of Employee199 
 
The main impetus for the “interpretive drift”200 of the statutory defini-
tion of supervisor arose in the context of professional employees, in particu-
lar, professional employees in the healthcare industry.201  By way of back-
                                                                                                                           
 196 See, e.g., Highland Superstores, Inc. v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 918, 921-22 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding 
that leadman who merely reported facts to supervisor did not exercise authority to discipline with inde-
pendent judgment); NLRB v. Harmon Indus., Inc., 565 F.2d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1977) (equipment 
repairman and senior technician who could make work assignments, grant overtime, and transfer em-
ployees, did not exercise independent judgment); Ross Porta-Plant, Inc. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1180, 1181-
82 (5th Cir. 1968) (crew leaders with no actual authority); Int’l Union of United Brewery Workers v. 
NLRB, 298 F.2d 297, (D.C. Cir. 1961) (driver salesmen who directed the work of their helpers); NLRB 
v. S. Bleachery & Print Works, Inc.. 257 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1958) (machine printers who checked 
the quality of cloth printed on the machine in their charge and who could initial time cards and material 
requisition slips); NLRB v. Newton Co., 236 F.2d 438, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1956) (straw bosses who per-
formed same work as coworkers); NLRB v. Beaver Meadow Creamery, 215 F.2d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 
1954) (worker who checked out eggs to driver-salesmen, kept record for bookkeeper of eggs on hand 
and instructed new workers in how to candle and grade eggs was at most a leadman); NLRB v. Parma 
Water Lifter Co., 211 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1954) (machinist who was put in charge during supervi-
sor’s absence). 
 197 NLRB v. Griggs Equip., Inc., 307 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 198 NLRB v. S. Bleachery & Print Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1958). 
 199 Portions of the discussion in this section were taken from and originally published in two of my 
recent articles:  The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recognition; and September Massa-
cre: The Latest Battle in the War on Workers’ Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act.  See 
generally Union Repression, supra note 13; September Massacre, supra note 13.  Several labor law 
scholars have written about this topic.  See, e.g., Ann Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar 
Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 738-40 
(2009) (comparing the breadth of the NLRA’s supervisory exemption with the narrower definitions 
under state labor laws); Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Exile:  
Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 Duke L. J. 2013, 2027 (2009); 
Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of Professional and Supervisory Status - Fertile 
Delta or Bermuda Triangle?, in LABOR LAW STORIES (Lara J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005). 
 200 I am borrowing this phrase from Ellen Dannin, Not a Limited, Confined, or Private Matter –
Who Is an “Employee” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 59 LAB. L. J. 5, 6 (2008). 
 201 Several well-known labor law scholars have written about the extent to which labor law’s 
treatment of professional workers has and will continue to shape labor law and the strength of the labor 
movement.  See, e.g., Risa L. Lieberwitz, Faculty in the Corporate University:  Professional Identity, 
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ground, in Doctors’ Hospital of Modesto, Inc., a case decided in 1970, the 
Board determined that a hospital’s registered nurses were not supervisors, 
even though they directed other, less-skilled employees.202  In the Board’s 
view, the nurses’ “daily on-the-job duties and authority in this regard are 
solely a product of their highly developed professional skills and do not, 
without more, constitute an exercise of supervisory authority in the interest 
of their [e]mployer.”203  In 1992, in Health Care & Retirement Corp. of 
America (HCR), the Board, which was made up of predominantly Republi-
can appointees, had no trouble applying its longstanding precedent to con-
clude that the nurses in that case were employees, not supervisors.204  But 
the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision reversed, finding that the Board’s    
patient-care analysis “created a false dichotomy . . . between acts taken in 
connection  with  patient  care  and  acts  taken  in  the  interest  of  the  
employer.”205 
In Providence Hospital, in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
HCR, the Clinton Board – under the leadership of Chairman William B. 
Gould IV206 – defined the term “independent judgment” in a manner that 
attempted to reconcile NLRA Section 2(11)’s exclusion of supervisors with 
Section 2(12)’s definition of professional employees.207  In particular, the 
Clinton Board explained that independent judgment does not include “ordi-
nary professional or technical judgment in directing less skilled employees 
to deliver services.”208  In NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., a 
                                                                                                                           
Law and Collective Action, 16 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 263 (2007); Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky 
River at the Intersection of Professional and Supervisory Status - Fertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle?, 
in LABOR LAW STORIES (Lara J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005); Marion G. Crain, The Trans-
formation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 543 (2004); Harry G. Hutchison, Toward 
a Robust Conception of “Independent Judgment”: Back to the Future?, 36 UNIV. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 
335 (2002); Marion G. Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expanding NLRA Coverage:  A Blueprint for 
Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REV. 953, 972-73 (1990); Matthew W. Finkin, The Supervisory 
Status of Professional Employees, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 805 (1977). 
 202 Doctors’ Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 950 (1970), enforced, 489 F.2d 772 (9th 
Cir. 1973). 
 203 Id. at 951. 
 204 306 N.L.R.B. 63, 63 n.1 (1992), enforcement denied, 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 511 
U.S. 571 (1994). 
 205 NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 577 (1994). 
 206 Chairman Gould is the Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus at Stanford Law 
School. 
 207 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 725-30 (1996). 
 208 320 N.L.R.B. at 732 (“Charge nurses’ daily assignments do not require any independent judg-
ment that goes beyond the professional judgment required of a supervisor.”); see also Marley Weiss, 
Kentucky River at the Intersection of Professional and Supervisory Status - Fertile Delta or Bermuda 
Triangle?, in LABOR LAW STORIES (Lara J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/124/ (detailing “the Battle over Unionization of 
Supervisors,” specifically in the case of Kentucky River).   
536 FIU Law Review [5:495 
 
divided Supreme Court rejected that interpretation on grounds that the 
Board’s construction inserted “a startling categorical exclusion into        
statutory text,” that goes “beyond the limits of what is ambiguous.”209 
Following the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Clinton Board’s con-
struction of “independent judgment,”210 the Bush II Board reversed course 
in a series of cases known as the Oakwood Trilogy, three cases (two       
involving nurses) that further broadened the statutory supervisory exemp-
tion in light of these Supreme Court rulings.211  Piggybacking on Kentucky 
River, the Board will now consider the greater skilled workers’ professional 
or technical direction of lesser skilled employees in determining whether 
the greater skilled worker is a supervisor.212 
The facts of most nurse-supervisor cases are very similar.  They occur 
in a healthcare facility, often an acute-care hospital or nursing home, with 
several patient-care wings and perhaps as many as several hundred licensed 
beds.  The healthcare facility typically imposes a management structure 
designed to provide twenty-four-hour, daily, on-site patient care and super-
vision.  The nurses and their assistants (certified nursing assistants or 
CNAs) often work one of three eight-hour shifts (8 a.m. to 4 p.m., 4 p.m. to 
midnight, and midnight to 8 a.m., for example), perhaps with half-hour 
overlaps between shifts so that the nurses can share patient and other infor-
mation with each other.  During the first or day shift and perhaps for part of 
the second or evening shift, at least one of the several nursing officers re-
mains on-site.  Those officers typically include a director of nursing and an 
assistant director of nursing.  There may be a chief nursing officer and other 
officers, all of who are undisputed supervisors and managers.   
There is also typically a first, second, and third shift charge nurse, 
whose statutory status (prior to Kentucky River and the Oakwood trilogy) 
might have been in dispute.  Charge nurses (RNs or LPNs) oversee their 
patient care units.  They assign staff nurses and CNAs (and perhaps even 
technicians and paramedics) to patients on their shifts.  They monitor    
patients in their units, meet with doctors, and liaison with patients’ family 
members.  They may have their own patient load, but typically not a full 
load, and often make a little more money for serving as charge nurses.  
Some charge nurses are permanent (spend all of their time as charge nurse); 
others rotate, by spending part of their time as staff nurses and part of their 
time in the role of charge nurse. 
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Staff registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical nurses (LPN) pro-
vide direct patient care in the patient care units.  RNs will implement      
doctors’ orders, administer medication, run blood tests, take vital signs, 
observe patients, liaison with patients’ loved ones, and process admissions 
and discharges.  Staff nurses (RNs or LPNs) will typically instruct less-
skilled employees (CNAs, for example) to feed, bathe, turn, or walk      
patients.  Staff nurses may also direct less-skilled employees to perform 
tests ordered by doctors. 
Given facts similar to these, the Bush II Board, in Oakwood, passed on 
four legal questions:   
(1) What  is  the  definition  of  “assign”  within  the  meaning  of  
Section 2(11)? 
(2) What is the definition of “responsibly to direct” within the mean-
ing of Section 2(11)? 
(3) What is the definition of “independent judgment” within the 
meaning of Section 2(11)? 
(4) What legal effect does the amount of time a worker spends au-
thorized to exercise one of the enumerated powers with independent 
judgment have on the question whether that worker is a statutory em-
ployee or supervisor? 
First, the Bush II Board defined the statutory term “assign,” as that 
word is used in the definition of supervisor, to mean “‘to appoint to a post 
or duty.’”213  To avoid overlap with the other 11 enumerated powers, the 
Bush II Board construed the term “‘assign’ to refer to the act of designating 
an employee to a place (such as a location, department, or wing), appoint-
ing an employee to a time (such as a shift or overtime period), or giving 
significant overall duties, i.e., tasks, to an employee.  That is, the place, 
time, and work of an employee are part of his/her terms and conditions of 
employment.”214  In the healthcare context, a worker, such as a nurse,     
engages in the supervisory power of assigning when he directs a staff nurse 
or other worker to care for a particular patient or when he assigns that     
employee to a department or a shift or directs that worker to perform a spe-
cific task. 
Second, the Bush II Board defined the statutory term “responsibly to 
direct” by focusing on the ordinary definition of responsible as meaning 
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accountable.215  Construing that statutory term, the Board held that “to be 
‘responsible,’ the person directing and performing the oversight of the em-
ployee must be accountable for the performance of the task by the other, 
such that some adverse consequence may befall the one providing the over-
sight if the tasks performed by the employee are not performed properly.”216  
The Board further specified that, to establish “accountability for purposes 
of responsible direction,” the employer must have “delegated to the putative 
supervisor the authority to direct the work and the authority to take correc-
tive action, if necessary.”217  There must also be “a prospect of adverse con-
sequences for the putative supervisor if he/she does not take these steps.”218   
Third, the Bush II Board, against the background of the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of the Clinton Board’s construction of “independent 
judgment,” defined that statutory term by deconstructing it into its two 
component words.  Relying on the ordinary, dictionary meaning of these 
component words – where independent means “‘not subject to control by 
others’”219 and judgment means “‘the action of judging; the mental or intel-
lectual process of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and com-
paring’”220 – the Board held that to exercise independent judgment, “an   
individual must at minimum act, or effectively recommend action, free of 
the control of others and form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and 
comparing data.”221 
In partial response to the dissent’s criticism, that the Board majority 
mechanistically relied on the dictionary to construe a statutory term of art, 
the majority agreed that the dictionary was only a starting point and that it 
was necessary to consider the NLRA’s legislative history, policies, and judi-
cial precedents.222  Noting that the plain language of Section 2(11) dictates 
that “independent judgment” must be construed in light of the contrasting 
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language, “‘not of a merely routine or clerical nature,’”223 and relying on the 
Supreme Court’s observation that independent judgment must lie some-
where between action that is completely free and action that is completely 
controlled by others, the Board held that it “must assess the degree of dis-
cretion exercised by the putative supervisor.”224   
The Board held that “judgment is not independent if it is dictated or 
controlled by detailed instructions, whether set forth in company policies or 
rules, the verbal instructions of a higher authority, or in the provisions of a 
collective-bargaining agreement.”225  Immediately undercutting that posi-
tion, the Board further commented that “the mere existence of company 
policies does not eliminate independent judgment from decision-making if 
the policies allow for discretionary choices.”226 
Fourth and finally, the Board held that “[w]here an individual is       
engaged a part of the time as a supervisor and the rest of the time as a unit 
employee, the legal standard for a supervisory determination is whether the 
individual spends a regular and substantial portion of his/her work time 
performing supervisory functions.”227  The Board clarified that under its 
standard, “‘regular’ means according to a pattern or schedule, as opposed to 
sporadic substitution.  The Board has not adopted a strict numerical defini-
tion of substantiality and has found supervisory status where the individuals 
have served in a supervisory role for at least 10-15 percent of their total 
work time.” 228   
The Board proceeded to apply those legal principles to three cases all 
decided on the same day.  First, in Oakwood, the Board found that 12 per-
manent charge nurses were statutory supervisors because they exercised the 
authority to assign nursing personnel to patients and to responsibly direct 
other less-skilled workers with the requisite independent judgment.229  The 
Board further found that because the employer failed to meet its burden of 
showing that the rotating charge nurses regularly served as charge nurses, it 
need not decide whether they exercised supervisory authority for a substan-
tial part of their work time.230 
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In Bev Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. (Golden Crest Health Care       
Center),231 the Board applied these legal principles to another set of charge 
nurses.  There, it held that the nurses’ authority to “request” that the aides 
“stay past the end of their shifts or . . . to come in from home” or work on a 
particular floor did not constitute the authority to “assign,” absent a show-
ing of authority to require that.232   
And in Croft Metals Inc.,233 the Board applied these principles to a lead 
person at a manufacturing facility.  There it found that these lead persons 
did not have the authority to assign other employees to “production lines or 
departments or to shifts over overtime periods” and that “the occasional 
switching of tasks . . . d[id] not implicate the authority to ‘assign’” as con-
structed by the Board.234  The Board further found that these lead persons 
did “responsibly direct” others because the record showed that they could 
“discipline” with “written warnings,”235 but that the employer had failed to 
show that this responsible direction was exercised with the requisite inde-
pendent judgment involving “a degree of discretion that rises above the 
‘merely routine or clerical.’”236  Instead, the lead person established a     
delivery schedule and generally used a standard loading pattern that       
dictated the placement of different products in the trucks. 
The dissent criticized the Board majority’s analysis as being “both in-
consistent with the statutory text and structure and inferior to alternative 
interpretations.”237  Along those lines, in addition to offering specific rea-
sons for rejecting the majority’s construction of the supervisory exemption, 
the dissent made an overarching criticism of the majority’s approach.  In the 
dissent’s view, the majority’s reliance on dictionary definitions results in an 
overly formalistic analysis that ignores the statutory context of the statutory 
exemption,238 the legislative purpose of that exemption, and the realities of 
such a far-reaching exemption.  Along these lines, the majority’s analysis 
fails to read the exemption in statutory context and therefore creates an in-
terpretation of Section 2(11) that is incoherent.    
In particular, as a matter of statutory construction, the dissent found 
that the majority’s “largely dictionary-driven approach” ignored the struc-
tural architecture of the Act, which “explicit[ly] recogni[zed] that profes-
sionals, and certain persons who perform work under the supervision of 
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professionals, may be statutory employees.”239  The dissent acknowledged 
that, using an isolated, noncontextual, formalistic approach could generate 
the majority’s result.  But that result is incoherent because it disenfranchises 
any professional who directs the work of or assigns work to any subordi-
nate, regardless of that professional’s supervisory or managerial reality – 
i.e., most professionals.  In the dissent’s view, contrary to the congressional 
intent to “distinguish[] between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and 
other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor 
vested with such genuine management prerogatives,”240 the majority’s deci-
sion thereby “threatens to create a new class of workers . . . who have     
neither the genuine prerogatives of management, nor the statutory rights of 
ordinary employees.”241  The economic reality, then, is that the majority’s 
rule disempowers a portion of the middle class – as many as 34 million by 
2012 – who has neither power (supervisory/managerial) nor autonomy 
(voice) at the workplace.242  The economic impact of the majority’s rule is 
compounded by its disenfranchisement of part-time supervisors, such as 
rotating charge nurses, who spend as little as ten percent of their time exer-
cising minimal supervisory authority. 
D. Implications for Professional Employees243 
The policy reasons for disenfranchising supervisors and even most   
independent contractors are unclear.  After all, the Railway Labor Act, 
which covers certain common carriers not covered by the NLRA, and many 
state statutes, which cover public employees not covered by the NLRA, 
have allowed supervisors and foremen to unionize with no problems.   For 
example, under the Railway Labor Act, protected employees include “every 
person in the service of a carrier . . . who performs any work defined as that 
of an employee or subordinate official . . .”244  The use of the term “subordi-
nate official” has been interpreted to include workers with substantial re-
sponsibilities.245 
Notwithstanding the experience under these statutes, the Supreme 
Court and now the Bush II Board have been reluctant to protect workers 
with even the most minor responsibilities who organize.  The Oakwood 
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trilogy, for example, is infamous not only for expanding the definition of 
the statutory term independent judgment in a manner that tends to swallow 
professional employees, but also for otherwise expanding the supervisor 
exemption in a way that punches a gaping hole in the otherwise seemingly 
broad statutory definition of employee.  By coupling broad definitions of 
“assign” and “responsibly to direct” with such a broad conception of “inde-
pendent judgment,” the Board makes concrete the concerns of the Kentucky 
River and Oakwood dissents – that most professional employees are no 
longer covered by the NLRA.  The trilogy then goes beyond Kentucky Riv-
er by finding supervisory status among workers who merely exercise su-
pervisory authority on a rotating basis. 
But even before Kentucky River or the Oakwood trilogy ever issued, 
reviewing courts were narrowing the definition of employee as it applied to 
professional employees through the managerial exemption.  Thus, in NLRB 
v. Bell Aerospace Co.,246 the Court directed the Board to clarify this exemp-
tion.  On remand, the Board defined managerial employees: 
as those who formulate, determine, and effectuate an Employer’s    
policies  . . . . [T]he determination of an employee’s ‘managerial’ sta-
tus depends upon the extent of his discretion, although the authority to 
exercise considerable discretion does not render an employee manage-
rial where his decision must conform to the employer’s established 
policy. 
. . . as those who formulate and effectuate management policies by   
expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer, and 
those who have discretion in the performance of their jobs                
independent of their employer’s established policy . . . managerial sta-
tus is not conferred upon rank-and-file workers, or upon those who 
perform routinely, but rather it is reserved for those in executive-type 
positions, those who are closely aligned with management as true rep-
resentatives of management.247 
Although the Board ultimately concluded that the workers at issue in 
Bell Aerospace Co. – buyers in the purchasing and procurement department 
of a plant engaged in research and development of aerospace products – 
were statutory employees and not managers because those workers “did not 
exercise sufficient independent discretion in their jobs to truly align them 
with management,”248 the legal precedent set under this line of cases       
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endorses the view that managers, even low-level managers, are exempted 
from NLRA coverage.  This is so notwithstanding the Act’s plain language, 
which does not expressly exempt such workers.  Indeed, even some confi-
dential employees, who work for managers, but are not themselves        
managers, are also excluded from the Act if they have access to confidential 
personnel-type information.249   
And in NLRB v. Yeshiva University,250 the Supreme Court held that 
full-time faculty members of Yeshiva University, a large, private education-
al institution, were all managerial employees because of the faculty’s role in 
faculty appointments, setting curriculum, grading, admission standards, 
course scheduling, and its “‘crucial role . . . in determining other central 
policies of the institution.’”251  The Court rejected the Board’s argument that 
the faculty members were not managers on grounds that the faculty mem-
bers exercised “independent professional judgment” when discharging their 
duties, which in this case required the faculty members to align themselves 
with management.252  The Court found the distinction between independent 
managerial judgment and independent professional judgment simply to be 
unpersuasive here, where the Court found no distinction between the      
faculty’s professional interests and the interests of the institution – “the 
business of a university is education.”253 
In sum, these managerial cases grow out of the same obsessive con-
cern that drove the supervisory exemption: “That an employer is entitled to 
the undivided loyalty of its representatives.”254  That concern is inconsistent 
with the core values of a just industrial democracy built on worker         
autonomy and dignity. 
E. Implications for the Autonomous Dignified Worker 
Neither the independent contractor nor the supervisory exemption, as 
drafted and construed, is compatible with the autonomous dignified worker.  
As a threshold matter, neither definition promotes worker autonomy.  This 
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is most clearly demonstrated with independent contractors.  Only those 
workers subjected to sufficient control and subordination are deemed      
employees under the common law test.  Although the Board has clarified 
that the independent contractor analysis should not be reduced to one fac-
tor,255 control permeates each factor of the Restatement’s multi-factored 
common-law test.  So while the full-time cook might retain creative control 
over her culinary menu, she still remains under the control of her employer 
in other ways or she is not an employee.256  So, too, with supervisors and 
managers – the more independent judgment or discretion they exercise, the 
less likely they are to be protected. 
Nor do these exemptions dignify workers.  Indeed, the supervisory   
exemption expressly de-dignifies workers by rationalizing a labor-
management binary with workers (“husbandmen and craftsmen”) relegated 
to having bronze souls257 and the owners, who possess gold souls, have “the 
power of command.”258  Supervisors and managers are the soldiers, whose 
silver souls are designed “to be auxiliaries”259 to those who command.    
Supervisors and managers must, therefore, be aligned with owners to main-
tain this binary.  In this “dream” or delusion imposed on silver and bronze 
workers by the ruling gold class, independent contractors are themselves 
aspiring gold people, who must compete with the other gold people for the 
economy’s resources. 
This analysis leads to one fairly straightforward observation: The   
statutory exemptions are inconsistent with promoting a workplace that    
values the autonomy and dignity of its workers.  Accordingly, either the 
autonomous dignified worker theory is flawed and should not serve as a 
foundation for workplace legal policies or the NLRA is fundamentally 
flawed by failing to reflect these values at the very gateway of protection.260   
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IV. CONCLUSION: RECONSTRUCTING 
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE 
Deconstructing the statutory definition of employee shows that the 
Board and the NLRA are not simply withering away but that the protections 
embodied in the labor act have been eroded by several actors – Congress, 
the courts, and, in some cases, the Board itself.  That erosion has mostly 
been to broaden the negative aspect of the statutory definition of employee, 
not only by congressional amendment, but also by judicial amendment and 
even by administrative oscillation.261 
The courts have made one of their most ominous marks on the super-
visory exemption.  The Supreme Court has twice struck down the Board’s 
attempt to read that exemption narrowly to include as many minor bosses 
and professional workers as possible.  In the Oakwood trilogy, the Bush II 
Board further eroded the definition by reversing course and broadly inter-
preting the supervisory powers of assignment and responsible direction. 
In another article, I argue that congressional enactment of the           
Re-Empowerment of Skilled and Professional Employees and Construction 
Tradeworkers (RESPECT) Act262 would go a long way toward putting the 
autonomous dignified union worker back to work.263  The RESPECT Act 
would have the immediate effect of overruling the Board’s recent Oakwood 
trilogy by narrowing the definition of supervisor in two ways.  First, the Act 
would remove the authority to assign and to responsibly direct other em-
ployees as conditions for finding supervisory status.  Second, the Act would 
require workers to possess supervisory authority over employees for a ma-
jority of that worker’s work time.  This would reverse the Board’s policy, 
explicated in the Oakwood trilogy, of finding supervisory status in cases 
where employees exercise supervisory powers in as little as ten percent of 
their work time.   
The question whether the RESPECT Act is likely to empower workers 
depends in part on the type of litigation that could arise from its enactment.  
The RESPECT Act would obviously spark litigation over the extent to 
which a worker’s time is spent discharging supervisory powers.  What is 
less obvious is that the RESPECT Act is also likely to spark litigation over 
the putative supervisor’s other powers, especially disciplinary power and 
the power to “effectively . . . recommend such action.” 264  By eliminating 
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the powers to assign and responsibly to direct from the twelve enumerated 
powers, and by retaining the authority to “hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, 
recall, promote, discharge, . . . reward . . . discipline . . . or to adjust       
[employee] grievances,”265 the RESPECT Act essentially limits the supervi-
sory exemption to those employees who have authority over other           
employees where authority entails one person’s actual power over another 
person.  While, from the employee’s perspective, this seems like the right 
move, such legislation may very well backfire if courts misunderstand the 
significance of the amendment and begin to find that workers hold the    
power to discipline in cases where there is very little authority, such as in 
cases where workers are merely reporting work transgressions to true su-
pervisors and managers.266 
The legacy of the independent contractor exemption is less obvious.  
Although one of the main goals of those who supported that exemption was 
to limit the Board’s discretion to distinguish between employees and inde-
pendent contractors, the results have been mixed.  Certainly the Board has 
been limited to applying the common law agency test in distinguishing   
between statutory employees and independent contractors, but, given the     
multi-factor, circumstantial nature of the test, the Board has had, in many 
cases, ample room to interpret the factual record to find either employee or 
independent contractor status.  Accordingly, the results of applying that test 
are likely to depend on the political composition of the Board and the ideo-
logical leanings of its members.   
And perhaps the untold story is about the Board itself, which has made 
the most pernicious contribution by attacking the affirmative aspect of the 
definition – even in light of the court-approved broad construction of     
employee.  By limiting the statutory definition to only those workers whose 
relationship with their employer is predominantly economic, and then    
applying that broad definition to students, disabled workers, and salts, the 
Board has gauged a gaping hole in the heart of the statutory definition of 
employee that is hardly natural. 
Given these problems with the statutory exemptions, I would go      
farther than the RESPECT Act and eliminate by congressional amendment 
the supervisory and independent contractor exemptions as well as the man-
agerial exemption that has been read into the Act.  I would also expressly 
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 266 Compare Hosp. Gen. Menonita v. NLRB, 393 F.3d 263, 267-68 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that 
evidence is insufficient to demonstrate supervisory status “where an employee’s involvement in the 
evaluation process is merely reportorial in nature”), with NLRB v. Quinnipiac Coll., 256 F.3d 68, 76-77 
(2d Cir. 2001) (overturning Board finding and holding that evidence is sufficient to demonstrate super-
visory status where employees “have the discretion whether to report an individual for disciplinary 
infractions”). 
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overrule the Bush II Board’s “predominantly economic” test.  The freedom 
to band together for mutual aid or protection should be protected as a fun-
damental right of all workers.  The United States, as the self-declared leader 
of the “free world,” should behave as a leader, set an example, and take 
seriously the freedom to associate, which includes the right of workers to 
band together in common cause.  
This proposal, of course, has no chance of passing in the near future.  
But perhaps less radical changes could pass.  The problem is coming up 
with less radical solutions to the problem of class struggle.  One possibility 
is to eliminate these exemptions, or at least the supervisory exemption, for 
very large employers with a multi-tiered hierarchical structure.  Again, this 
would take congressional amendment, but a case could be made that the 
balance of power in those organizations is sufficiently warped to justify the 
change, at least to those moderate pro-business policymakers who believe 
in the basic policies underlying the NLRA. 
A less radical solution, for the problems associated with exempting   
independent contractors from statutory coverage, is more complex.  Given 
the likelihood that the ideological leanings of board members change with 
elections, which in turn contribute to less stable and predictable results, the 
Board should at least adopt (and consistently apply) the principle that the 
purpose in applying the common law agency test is to effectuate the pur-
poses of the NLRA, which includes protecting workers.  It is well-known 
that the test for independent-contractor status is applied differently depend-
ing on the context in which it is being applied.  So, for example, that test 
tends to be applied with an eye toward protecting workers when applied for 
purposes of worker compensation statutes and is applied with an eye toward 
protecting third parties when applied in the vicarious liability context.  Dis-
tinguishing between a statutory employee and an independent contractor for 
purposes of the NLRA should be accomplished with an eye    toward pro-
tecting Section 7 rights.  While the Obama Board could make this statement 
through adjudication, it would be less subject to administrative oscillation if 
achieved through rulemaking.267   
                                                                                                                           
 267 Along these lines, labor law is in line to continue to suffer from one-step-forward-two-steps-
backward oscillation for as long as the Board continues to be comprised of members with political 
ideologies.  I thus agree with many of the comments regarding oscillation made by former board mem-
ber Dennis Walsh recently made at the ACS Event:  The National Labor Relations Act at 75 – Looking 
Back, Looking Forward.  There, Member Walsh remarked on effects of an increasingly politicized 
board, short-term board members, long-term recess appointments, and the need to fix the appointment 
process through, among other things, hold-over appointments.  That panel discussion is available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/16126.  Member Walsh also had many reservations about rulemaking.  For 
a more in-depth discussion of the pros and cons of NLRB rulemaking, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The 
Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 411. 
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Another less radical solution is to amend the NLRA by defining inde-
pendent contractor more along the lines of the economic realities test, by 
which the court examines a variety of factors, including:  
 “the degree of control that the putative employer has over the 
manner in which the work is performed;” 
 “the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss dependent on his 
managerial skill;” 
 “the worker’s investment in equipment or material, or his em-
ployment of other workers;” 
 “the degree of skill required for the work;” 
 “the permanency of the working relationship;” 
 “the degree to which the services rendered are an integral part 
of the putative employer’s business.”268  
It is unclear, however, whether the economic realities test, which is        
“designed to capture the economic realities of the relationship between the 
worker and the putative employer,”269 would actually make any difference 
in application.  So perhaps the better solution is to create what Canada has, 
the distinction between the independent contractor, who does not have   
collective-bargaining rights, and the dependent contractor, who does have 
collective-bargaining rights.  Dependent contractors, as defined under the 
Canadian Code, are  
any other person who, whether or not employed under a contract or 
employment, performs work or services for another person on such 
terms and conditions that they are, in relation to that other person, in a 
position of economic dependence on, and under an obligation to       
perform duties for, that other person. 270 
This definition has the advantage of keying in on the value of worker     
autonomy vis-á-vis the employer.  And while I see no good reason to disen-
franchise even a truly autonomous, independent contractor, introducing the 
concept of a dependent contractor would go a long way toward capturing at 
least the most vulnerable contractors. 
But no policy, radical, moderate, or otherwise, will help workers band 
together for mutual aid or protection unless workers have class conscious-
                                                                                                                           
 268 See Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 269 Id. at 305. 
 270 See Judy Fudge, A Canadian Perspective on the Scope of Employment Standards, Labor 
Rights, and Social Protection: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 31 COMP. LAB. L. J. 253, 259-60 
(2010) (quoting Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., ch. L 2, s.3(1) (1985)). 
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ness.  And even though both unions and big business have image problems 
(unions are perceived as wedded to organized crime and big business is 
currently perceived as greedy), big business has historically controlled the 
media and its messages.271  Perhaps the best chance of revitalizing the union 
movement then is to ensure organizational rights through the internet.  After 
all, it doesn’t matter how many workers are “protected” by the NLRA, if 
there is nothing to protect.  If I am right, the most important battleground in 
putting the autonomous dignified union worker back to work will be how 
the Obama Board and subsequent boards handle real and virtual workplace 
organizing using modern technology such as Facebook and other social 
networks.272 
 
                                                                                                                           
 271 Corporate control over the media is likely to grow worse with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United  v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (holding that it is not constitutionally permissible 
under the First Amendment for the government to suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
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tory law) (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).  A discussion of how corporations are likely to benefit more from Citizens 
United than unions is beyond the scope of this article. 
 272 See generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse 
in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
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